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I. INTRODUCTION
Are the fishermen to be driven from their fishing-grounds, are
the people to be deprived of food, that a few men may be made
rich out of the public treasury of the sea?' The law locks up the
man or woman who steals the goose from the common; but
leaves the greater villain loose who steals the common from the
2
goose.
Seventy percent of the world's fish populations are in serious
decline; some have been fished to near extinction.' While domestic
and international efforts are underway to curb the rate at which
the remaining fish are being depleted, the demand for fish
appears to be outstripping these initiatives-before they can take
hold, the fish may be gone. In response to this increasingly dire
situation, many countries, including the United States, have turned
to fish farming in hope of taking pressure off of certain wild stocks
of fish while still meeting consumer demands for them. More
recently, non-U.S. fish farmers have moved the locus of their
activities from land and coastal waters to the open oceans. In this
country, ocean fish ranching is still at the experimental stage, but
hopes are high that it could become commercially profitable in
1. S.F. Baird, Report on the Condition of the Sea Fisheries of the South Coast of New England
in 1871 and 1872, in REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION OF FISH AND FISHERIES FOR 1872 101
(Washington, D.C., USGPO 1873), quoted in BonnieJ. McCay, The Culture of the Commoners:
Historical Observations on Old and New World Fisheries, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS:
THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES 195, 206 (Bonnie J. McCay &
James M. Acheson eds., 1990).
2. Seth Macinko & David W. Bromley, Property & Fisheries for the Twenty-First Century:
Seeking Coherence from Legal and Economic Doctrines, 28 VT. L. REV. 623, 648 (2004).
3. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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the United States' Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ"). 4 One
problem hindering the development of a robust ocean fish
ranching industry in the United States is the absence of a
comprehensive regulatory program. Increasing pressure to
develop the ocean fish ranching industry and the current structure
of the industry, however, may mean that for the foreseeable future
ocean fish ranching will happen in a regulatory vacuum.
While much has been written about the adverse environmental
and economic impacts of fish farming,5 including concerns about
moving these activities offshore,6 little has been written about the
property law implications of ocean fish ranching. Viewing ocean
fish ranching through a property lens invites consideration of
common law property concepts like the public trust doctrine. The
public trust doctrine offers a set of useful principles that could be
applied to ocean fish ranching until the government develops a
suitable regulatory framework. Because the public trust doctrine
traditionally applies only to coastal waters, though, extending it to
the EEZ requires a new legal basis. This article proposes two such
theoretical bases: one founded on the public domain status of
EEZ, the other in the extension of state common law to the EEZ.
Before expanding on the reasons why the public trust doctrine
could and should apply to ocean fish ranching, the article provides
background information on the status of the world's fisheries, the
4. The United States EEZ "extends 200 nautical miles offshore" and is the "largest"
EEZ in the world. FINAL REPORT ON THE U.S. COMMISSION OF OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN
BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21' r  CENTURY 5 (2004), available at
http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full-color-rpt/000o-ceanfull-report.pdf.
Spanning over 13,000 miles of coastline and containing 3.4 million square nautical miles
of ocean (equivalent to 44.2 square miles), the U.S. EEZ is "larger than the combined land
area of the 50 states." Id. In 1966, the United States extended its exclusive jurisdiction over
fisheries to twelve nautical miles, which it then further extended in 1976 "by legislating a
fishery conservation zone" 200 miles from the coast. In 1983, this zone was "absorbed" into
the U.S. EEZ. Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private
Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 117, 153 n.89 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Erin R. Englebrecht, Comment, Can Aquaculture Continue to Circumvent the
Regulatory Net of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 51 EMORY L.J.
1187 (2002); Press Release, Sea Web, Farming the Tigers of the Sea Undermines the
Promise of Aquaculture (July 3, 2003),
http://www.seaweb.org/documents/PR-2003.7.3.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Jeremy Firestone & Robert Barber, Fish as Pollutants: Limitations of and
Crosscurrents in Law, Science, Management, and Policy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 693 (2003); Robin
Kundis Craig, The Other Side of Sustainable Aquaculture: Mariculture and Nonpoint Source
Pollution, 9 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 163 (2002); Melissa Schatzberg, Note, Salmon Aquaculture
in Federal Waters: Shaping Offshore Aquaculture Through the Coastal Zone Management Act, 55
STAN. L. REv. 249 (2002).
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growth of the fish farming industry and its movement offshore,
environmental and economic concerns, and the existing
regulatory picture. The second part of the article explains the
concept of common pool resources and how open access has
contributed to the decline in wild fish stocks and prompted the
creation of property-based responses like individual fishing quotas
("IFQs"). The third section describes the public trust doctrine and
develops two bases for the doctrine's application to activities
occurring within the EEZ: (1) the public domain nature of the
EEZ to which federal common law might apply; and (2) the
potential extension of state common law beyond state waters. The
first basis requires an argument that there is a federal common law
public trust doctrine that attaches to public lands, and the second
presumes that the federal laws governing the EEZ include a role
for state common law's continuing regulatory presence.
Professor William Buzbee's work on the "regulatory
commons,"7 described in the fourth part of the article, underscores
the need to make these doctrinal leaps. He explains why regulatory
commons are counter-productive yet self-perpetuating. In turn,
this article shows how ocean fish ranching is an example of such a
commons and argues that the cure for it is not privatizing the
resource. The article concludes by explaining how the application
of the public trust doctrine will end the ocean fish ranching
regulatory commons and why applying the doctrine, until effective
regulation eliminates the potential adverse environmental and
economic effects of these activities, makes good policy sense, and is
preferable to market-based solutions.
II. BACKGROUND
This part of the article discusses the collapse of finfish stocks
and the finfish industry, the minimal success of governmental
efforts to stop the downward spiral in wild fish stocks, the
concomitant growth in fish farming, and the gradual movement of
these activities offshore to lessen their impacts on the terrestrial
and nearshore environments. The part also describes the adverse
7. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps,
89 IOwA L. REv. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Buzbee, Regulatory Commons]. Professor Buzbee has
expanded his critique of the perils of regulatory fragmentation in Contextual Environmental
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005) and The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum,
Westway and the Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323 (2005) [hereinafter
Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum].
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environmental effects of raising fish in confined pens and fish
farming's economic impact on local fishing interests and their
communities. Finally, this section sets out the current legal
framework for regulating ocean fish farming and the problems
that this patchwork of laws creates.
A. The Collapse of Finfish Stocks and the Finfishing Industry
Why does everyone overfish, even to the detriment of the body of
water and its living stocks? According to the economic account,
everyone does so because each user knows that, even if any
particular individual refrains from fishing so intensely, everyone
else will continue to fish, and in fact the other might just fish a
little bit more, to take up the slack left by the moderate fisher.
The moderate fisher, in short, would just be a sucker ....
"Ocean fisheries are one of the world's most important resources."9
Fisheries are a "major source of both sustenance and
employment."'" As a reflection of their importance, the global
consumption of fish has "almost doubled in under half a
century."" Although the National Oceanic & Atmospheric
Administration ("NOAA") 2 has made a little progress rebuilding
some depleted fisheries in this country, it has not been able to stop
the widespread over-fishing or other activities, such as habitat loss
8. Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common
Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1991).
9. Barton H. Thompson,Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons,
30 ENVrL. L. 241, 247 (2000).
10. Id. See also Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, World Ocean Public Trust: High Seas Fisheries
After Grotius-Towards a New Ocean Ethos?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 645, 705 n.227
(2004) (citing Asian Development Bank statistics that "more than one billion people
around the world depend on fish for their primary source of protein", and approximately
50 million people "rely" on some aspects of the small scale fishing industry "for their
livelihoods"). Moreover,.fish byproducts are used in cosmetics, animal feeds, fertilizers,
detergents, and jewelry as well as in industrial and pharmaceutical products. Id.
11. The Promise of a Blue Revolution-Fish Farming: Can Farming Meet the World's Need for
Fish?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 2003, at 19.
12. NOAA's responsibilities over fisheries resources stem from the 1976 Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation & Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (Westlaw 2006),
amended by Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA), Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 16 and 46 U.S.C.) (authorizing the federal government
to establish essential fish habitat and to determine optimum yield on the "basis of
maximum sustainable yield from the fishery, as reduced by any relevant social, economic,
or ecological factor," and authorizing states to regulate fishing vessels outside state
territorial waters under certain circumstances).
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and pollution that adversely affect fish stocks.13 In 2003, NOAA
Fisheries reported that eighty-six stocks were over-fished and sixty-
six species were in the process of being over-fished. 14 According to
Donna Christie "only" 25% of "[main fish] stocks or species groups
are underexploited or moderately exploited," 47% are "fully
exploited," and 18% are "overexploited"; the remaining 10% "are
either significantly depleted or recovering from depletion."15
Moreover, "nine of the world's seventeen major fishing grounds
are in serious decline; four have been commercially fished out."'6
"The unthinkable has come to pass: The wealth of oceans, once
inexhaustible, has proven finite, and fish, once dubbed the 'poor
man's protein,' have become a resource coveted-and fought
over-by nations.'
17
There are many causes of the dire situation of the world's
13. See Donna R. Christie, Living Marine Resources Management: A Proposal for
Integration of United States Management Regimes, 34 ENVTL. L. 107, 120 (2004) (commenting
on the optimism of NOAA's statistic that in five years since the passage of the SFA it had
taken twenty species off the list of over-fished fish and eliminated overfishing for twenty-
five other species, and noting that during "the same period overfishing ha[d] begun in 14
cases, and in 13 cases a stock had become overfished").
14. Id. at 120. Christie additionally says "the overfished status of 695 stocks remains
classified as 'unknown or not defined,"' and the fishing status of an additional 658 stocks
"cannot be determined because the harvest rate is not known" to NOAA or the agency has
not established "the threshold for overfishing." Id. at 120. See also Dallas DeLuca, Student
Article, One for Me and One for You: An Analysis of the Initial Allocation of Fishing Quotas, 13
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 723, 726-27 (2005) (saying the three most recent National Marine
Fisheries Service reports to Congress showed "an average of 23% of major U.S. fisheries
are subject to overfishing and that 30% of major U.S. fisheries are overfished" (citations
omitted)).
15. Donna R. Christie, It Don't Come EEZ: The Failure and Future of Coastal State Fisheries
Management, 14J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (2004). See also Thompson, supra note 8, at
247 (saying NMFS reports that over one third of the fish stocks under its jurisdiction,
whose status it knows about, "are overutilized: almost another half are fully utilized," and
that the "current population levels of almost half of those stocks, moreover, are below the
levels needed to support long-term potential yield"); JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT
MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 33 (2004) ("Data reveal
that the global fish catch has shown a strong and consistent downturn every year since
1988 .... ).
16. Thompson, supra note 8, at 247. See also SPETH, supra note 15, at 15 ("In 1960, 5
percent of marine fisheries were either fished to capacity or overfished; today 75 percent
of marine fisheries are in this condition."). Speth also comments that overfishing has
severely impacted coral reefs and has led to the disappearance of spiny lobster, bumphead
parrotfish, Nassau grouper, and other reef species. Id. at 34.
17. Michael Perfit, Diminishing Returns: Exploiting the Ocean's Bounty, NAT'L.
GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 1995, at 2, quoted byJose L. Fernandez, Public Trust, Riparian Rights, and
Aquaculture: A Storm Brewing in the Ocean State, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 293,
294 (1996).
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fisheries, 8 but this article focuses primarily on the inability of
fishers to "control their selfish impulses to overfish," thus acting
out Hardin's tragedy,0 in which the rational economic individual is
18. Other commonly cited reasons for the decline in fish species are loss of spawning
and nursery habitat, coastal development, overfishing, pollution, invasive non-native
species, and global climate change. See Robin Kundis Craig, Protecting International Marine
Biodiversity: International Treaties and National Systems of Marine Protected Areas, 20J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 333, 34548 (2004-2005) (mentioning land-based water and air pollution and
ocean dumping among the sources of harmful pollution); Dean Scott, Scientists Say Reports
of Rising Sea Levels Signal Possible Effects on Fish Population, 37 Env't Rep. (BNA) 890 (Apr.
28, 2006) (reporting on congressional testimony by NOAA's director for scientific
programs to the Senate Commerce Subcommittee of Global Climate Change identifying
global climate change as one of the factors that could have a "long term influence" on
marine ecosystems and world fish populations by precipitating a decline in plankton at the
bottom of the aquatic food chain.); Editorial, Acid Oceans: Scientists Identify Another
Potentially Devastating Consequence of Failing to Control Greenhouse Gases, WASH. POST, July 6,
2006, at A20 (discussing a recent report by federal scientists and university researchers
"highlight[ing] ... [the] potentially devastating ecological consequences" of the oceans'
increased acidification from carbon emissions); Editorial, Sea Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2006, at A16 (identifying the problems of "multiple and overlapping government
agencies," coastal sprawl, and the failure to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty as factors
making it "all the more urgent that Congress get right the one recommendation that has
survived Washington's torpor: a much-needed update of the Magnuson-Stevens Act").
19. Victor B. Flatt, Enron Story and Environmental Policy, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10485, 10492 (2003). One of the most puzzling aspects of the over-fishing problem
has been the problem fishers have self-regulating given the dire consequences of the
collapse of a fishery. Some blame this problem on the tragedy of the commons and the
contribution of government regulations to that tragedy, assuming that "as long as the rule
of capture prevails," fisherman are trapped in a downward spiral of consumption that they
"cannot break out of... unless they have a private right to harvest an amount of fish which
they can use or sell." Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship
and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 393, 399 (1999). See also Michael C.
Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rule of Capture
and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENvrL. L. 673, 690 (2005). ("By awarding the first taker
the exclusive rights to the resource, an unrestricted rule of capture encouraged resource
exploitation . . . . By rewarding efficient capture, America's . . . policies promoted
investment in capture technology, encouraging hunters to purchase bigger nets, better
guns, and more ammunition."). While some United States fishing communities have been
able to regulate themselves, see, e.g., James M. Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs Revisited: Economic
and Ecological Effects of Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry, in THE QUESTION OF THE
COMMONS, supra note 1, at 371, most have not, and according to Thompson have "actively
fought" stronger management and enforcement efforts that would reduce catches.
Thompson, supra note 8, at 248.
20. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). See also
Thompson, supra note 8, at 242 (noting that while not consuming as much of a commonly
available resource as possible is in the interest of "[s]ociety as a whole," preserving the
resource makes "one a patsy" where "no one can bind anyone else's actions .... The high
road leads nowhere," even though "[t]he cumulative results of reasonable individual
choices is collective disaster"). Many common property scholars, however, do not think
that there is a tragedy of the commons, or, if there is one, that it is inevitable. See, e.g.,
Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries: Contracting for the
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driven inexorably to extract the last wild fish from the ocean
commons. 1 Fishers have additionally over exploited unregulated
fisheries by fishing "down the food web, ' 2  and their uncontrolled
bycatch has wiped out entire populations of untargeted species.5
Increased fishing capacity and more efficient technologies are
outpacing the capacity of stocks to replenish themselves, as
indicated by the "recent periodic leveling-off or decline in total
marine catch," and are making matters worse.24  "Modern
technologies now enable fishermen to go wherever the fish are
Commons, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813, 816 (1997), (describing commons scholars like Ostrom as
"adherents" to the view that the commons in Hardin's "metaphor" was "not tragic at all,"
and that the tragedy only occurred when the market economy "destroyed the communal
property regime and its system of self-governance"); Thompson, supra note 8, at 242-43
(summarizing recent academic literature on why the tragedy of commons is not
inevitable).
21. In fisheries, an individual fisher has little incentive to "be [a] steward[] of the
resource" because the cost of investing in the conservation or enhancement of fish stocks
will be "fully borne" by her, while the benefits of her good deeds will inure to all the
fishers. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 6, at 16. "Each fisher acting
in an individually rational manner is likely to be a free rider, hoping for ameliorative
efforts by others, or perhaps just focusing on short-term gain." Id. The high cost of
collecting information about the population status of individual fish stocks also makes
fishers free riders as "seldom will individual fishers have incentives to research and
produce information about the resource," and each will "hope that others produce such
information." Id.
22. Fishing down the food chain occurs when a fishery becomes fished out and
serves as an "economic 'prop' for struggling fishermen." Christie , supra note 12, at 122.
The practice disrupts the marine ecosystem, interfering with the recovery of traditionally
fished species. Id. Christie cites the unregulated fishing for the spiny dogfish, used in
England for fish and chips, as an example of this practice, which increased "tenfold" due
to depleted stocks and increased regulation of the groundfish catch so that by 2000 the
female population of the fish had decreased by eighty percent. Id.
23. Id. at 120-21. Christie uses as an example of the bycatch problem of the Gulf of
Mexico red snapper, where less than twenty percent of each year's juvenile class survives
shrimp nets. Id. at 122. See alsoJuliet Eilperin, Study: U.S. Fisheries Discard 22% of Catch,
WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2005, at A03 (reporting that using eleven years worth of data, U.S.
fisheries "on average" throw away "1.1 million tons of the fish they catch"). Christie cites
the collapse of New England's groundfish fishery (cod and yellowtail flounder) between
1982 and 1994 as one of the more spectacular examples of some of these problems.
Christie, supra note 12, at 121. The collapse of this fishery resulted in a federal district
court judge unsuccessfully attempting to design a remedy to allow the fishery to recover.
Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 195 F. Supp. 2d 186 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding
government violated over-fishing, rebuilding, and bycatch provisions of SFA), vacated, 211
F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002).
24. Christie, supra note 14, at 4. According to Christie, another sign wild stocks are
not replenishing themselves is the increased percentage of 'Juveniles and lower-value
species" observed in landings, which, when coupled with over-fishing and the practice of
fishing down the food web, "can lead to long-term and potential irreversible ecosystem
level consequences through the effect on "predatory relationships, genetic diversity of fish
stocks, and the future recruitment and regenerative capacity of [fisheries]." Id.
[Vol. 26:3
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found and to identify, track, and catch the fish with a relentless
efficiency. 2 1 While intense "high seas fishing for straddling stocks
and highly migratory species" like tuna and various shark species
has received "recent international attention," over 90% of the fish
are within 200 nautical miles of the U.S. coastline and "distant" or
high seas fishers contribute only 5% to total marine landings.26
As fish stocks decline, governments, such as the United States,
take various forms of preemptive action against fishers, such as
restricting types of fishing gear, the hours/day or days/month of
fishing, the size of a fisher's daily or annual catch, and even closing
fishing areas to allow the remaining fish stocks to recover.27 While,
these initiatives financially hurt fishers, even "driv[ing] some out of
business,, 21 the impact of declining catches on local fishers and
fishing communities can be just as devastating. 29 Many of these
fishers have over-capitalized their investments in their boats and
25. Thompson, supra note 8, at 247.
26. Christie, supra note 14, at 5.
27. See Abby Goodnough, A Favorite Florida Fish is Off the Menu Till Next Year, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005 (reporting on the temporary closing of the Gulf of Mexico
commercial grouper fishery and limitations placed on recreational fishing for grouper);
Seth Macinko, Public or Private?: United States Commercial Fisheries Management and the Public
Trust Doctrine, Reciprocal Challenges, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 919, 922 (1993) (describing
limited entry as a way to "target perceived irrationalities in so-called 'derby style' open
access fisheries" where there is a "competitive 'race for fish,'" which "spurs continual
reinvestment (of captured economic rent) in technology in pursuit of competitive
advantage," leading to "both economic and biological consequences that are deemed
undesirable"). But see OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 173-77 (1990) (documenting
the failure of various regulatory efforts by the Canadian government when applied to a
self-regulating Nova Scotia fishing village); Ralph Townsend & James A. Wilson, An
Economic View of the Tragedy of the Commons, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note
1, at 320 (criticizing "extensive rule structure[s]" required to reduce fishing effort to
achieve sustainable fisheries because they lead to "high enforcement costs and/or fishing
effort that exceeds the level desired"); Evelyn Pinkerton, Intercepting the State: Dramatic
Processes in the Assertion of Local Co-Management Rights, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS,
supra note 1, at 344 (saying that in the case examined, "it is the state that permits and even
creates the resource problem; it is the community, including local fishermen, that holds
the problem in check"); DeLuca, supra note 13, at 728 (saying such restrictions "frequently
resulted in drastically abbreviated fishing seasons ('derbies')" causing "over-capitalization
of the [fishing] fleet, high rates of bycatch, highgrading, ghost fishing, and unsafe fishing
practices which resulted in loss of boats and lives" (citations omitted)).
28. Christie, supra note 12, at 161 (quoting A.M.L. Int'l Inc. v. Daley, 107 F. Supp. 2d
90, 108 n.29 (D. Mass. 2000)).
29. See McCay, supra note 1, at 206 (saying overfishing deprives. fishermen of
common-use rights," and as such can also be seen as "a social tragedy"); S.F. Baird, supra
note 1, at 221 ("[T]he privilege of fishing where no fish are to be found, is equivalent to
no right to catch fish.").
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fishing gear as they race to scoop up the remaining fish.3 ° So when
a fishery collapses, the effects on those communities are
particularly severe.3 ' The most spectacular illustration of what
happens when a fishery collapses was the collapse of the
Newfoundland groundfishery in the early 1990s. 32 When there are
a limited number of fish in the ocean and more individuals enter
the industry, those already fishing have to "race" harder to
"achieve a return on their investment., 33  The result is that
"overcapitalization and overcapacity increase, and the resource,
however renewable, is overexploited and depleted."34
B. The Growth of the Fish Farming Industry
People who go fishing are the last commercial market hunters in
30. Over-capitalization is a response to the fishing version of the tragedy of the
commons as participants in the race to capture the last fish invest in larger boats and more
effective fishing gear. See Pinkerton, supra note 26, at 350 (describing the over-
capitalization of a Canadian mobile seine fleet in its search for more fish). See also
Townsend & Wilson, supra note 26, at 313 (noting that "[i]n nearly every fishery
examined, economists found excessive investment in harvesting capacity, low economic
returns to fishermen, and increasing signs of stock decline which they attributed to the
institution of open access"); Macinko, supra note 26, at 922 (saying "[o]vercapitalization
represents the tragedy of rent dissipation, an unnecessary diversion of capital and labor
that could be released to more productive sectors of the national economy.").
31. Katherine Marvin makes the point that although large investments in outfitting
their boats "means that there are steep supply curves for fishermen" and that they receive
low individual economic rent, the rise in costs must be "equally steep" before they will stop
fishing, even when the "resource yield has started to decline." Katherine A. Marvin, Note,
Protecting Common Property Resources Through the Marketplace: Individual Transferable Quotas for
Surf Clams and Ocean Quahogs, 16 VT. L. REv. 1127, 1145 n.147 (1992).
32. See, e.g., Fred Mason, The Newfoundland Cod Stock Collapse: A Review and Analysis of
Social Factors, 17 ELECTRONIC GREEN J., Dec. 2002,
http://egj.lib.uidaho.edu/egjl7/masonl.html (describing the causes of the collapse of
the cod fishery).
33. Marvin, supra note 30, at 1145. One effect of the need to venture further offshore
to catch fish has been an increase in the amount of fuel the fishing industry consumes.
According to a recent report in the New York Times, "if the fishing industry were a
country, it would rank with the Netherlands as the world's 18th-largest oil consumer" and
"is the only major industry in the world that is getting more and more energy-inefficient,"
adding to the "list of concerns about fishing as a destructive practice." Cornelia Dean,
Fishing Industry's Fuel Efficiency Gets Worse as Ocean Stocks Get Thinner, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2005, at F3. However, "growing fish in aquaculture pens can be less energy efficient than
fishing." Id.
34. Marvin, supra note 30, at 1145. Marvin also criticizes the adoption of
"conservation measures" like total industry quotas, which she says merely drive fishermen
to race harder and invest in more effective gear and the government to tighten the
restrictions "in a constant race with the ingenuity of the regulated." Id. at 1146.
Restrictions can also create unnecessary hazards and enforcement problems. Id. at 1147-
48.
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the world.... We don't do that anymore on land.3 '
As stocks of wild fish decline, aquaculture has increased.36
The reliance "on aquaculture to bridge the gap" between the
supply of, and demand for, fish is "most acute in the
developing world where fish protein provides between 19%
and 50% of all animal protein consumed., 7 But farmed fish
also offers the potential of a plentiful supply of cheaper food in
developed countries.3 ' Additionally, aquaculture provides
employment to millions of persons in the developing world. 9
As a result, aquaculture's growth is outpacing all other animal-
based sectors of the world's economy, including traditional
fisheries."
In this country, aquaculture presents a way to take pressure off
of wild stock4 and reduce the United States' seafood trade deficit
of nearly seven billion dollars annually.42 Farmed fish also provide
35. Juliet Eilperin, Fish Farming's Bounty Isn't Without Barbs, WASH. POST, Jan. 24,
2005, at A], A4 (quoting Sebastian Bell, Executive Director of the Maine Aquaculture
Association). See also Roy Whitehead, Jr., Catherine Gould, & Walter Block, The Value of
Private Water Rights: From a Legal and Economic Perspective, 9 ALB. L. ENVrL. OUTLOOK 313,
338 n.177 (2004) (saying "as humans moved from hunting to farming on the land, they
should also move from fishing to farming in the oceans. Man will not arrive at a modern
system of economics on the oceans until this move is made.").
36. "Aquaculture is the fastest growing sector of the world food economy, increasing
by more than 10% per year," and in 2003 counted for more than thirty percent of all fish
consumed. Press Release, Sea Web, supra note 4.
37. Shannon R. Wilson, Sustainable Aquaculture: An Organizing Solution in International
Law, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 491, 496. See also id. at 495-496 (saying ninety percent of
aquaculture consists of "small scale [projects] in developing countries to meet dietary
needs," and 81% occurs in " Low Income Food Deficit Countries," mostly in Asia and
Africa).
38. See id. at 497 (saying developed countries will rely on aquaculture to supplement
fish supply and reduce fish product prices).
39. Id. at 498.Wilson notes, however, that aquaculture for export of fish products is
"often undertaken by foreign nationals, rather than by local individuals with a vested
interest in the local economy." Id. See also Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 255 (saying that the
"startup capital, skill, and time" required to run an aquaculture operation make the
"industry ripe for consolidation under multinational companies" and, therefore,
aquaculture will not necessarily "reincarnate a fishing community that once prospered
from a now-depleted resource"); id. (saying while "fish processing and other land-based
activities [associated with aquaculture] could createjobs in coastal areas, raising salmon as
an employee of a large farm is quite a different way of life than catching them as the owner
of a small boat,").
40. Wilson, supra note 36, at 498.
41. See Craig, supra note 5, at 165 n.10 (saying aquaculture reduces pressure on wild
stocks and helps with their recovery). Schatzberg disputes that this is actually occurring
with respect to wild salmon. Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 254.
42. U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 330.
According to the National Sea Grant College Program, the United States imports greater
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"the seeds" for replenishing depleted stocks.43 Aquaculture can be
an "attractive source of revenue and employment" to depressed
fishing communities" and has lowered the price of once very costly
seafood products like shrimp and salmon.45
Experts maintain that "worldwide fisheries production will be
inadequate to meet the needs of the world's population, without
supplementation through aquaculture,' '4 a conclusion which may
account for the industry's rapid growth. While the total catch of
wild fish worldwide has "leveled off" at slightly less than 100
million tons,47 total global aquaculture production more than
doubled in both weight and value from 1988 to 1997.4" By 1997,
28% of the global seafood market consisted of aquaculture
than 60% of the fish and shellfish it consumes annually. Press Release, Sea Grant, Science
Supporting Sustainable Marine Aquaculture 1 (2004) (on file with author), available at
http://govdocs.aquake.org/cgi/reprint/2005/801/8010130.pdf. This deficit is "the
largest for any agricultural commodity," and, according to the FDA, the value of imported
shrimp, Atlantic salmon, and tilapia "were worth as much as the combined exports of the
U.S. broiler and hog industries." Craig, supra note 5, at 166,166 n.13.
43. See Press Release, Sea Grant, supra note 41, at 2 (citing "the potential for
rebuilding collapsed wild fish stocks through the use of aquacultured fish"). See also Craig,
supra note 6, at 167 (listing "wild stock enhancement" as a "potential purpose[]" for
aquaculture).
44. Firestone & Barber, supra note 5, at 708. See also Wilson, supra note 37, at 499
(saying aquaculture industry employs nearly 100,000 people, which is "projected to
increase to 500,000 by 2025"). But see MICHAEL WEBER, SEAWEB AQUACULTURE
CLEARINGHOUSE, WHAT PRICE FARMED FISH: A REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIAL
COSTS OF FARMING CARNIVOROUS FISH EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2003),
http://www.seaweb.org/resources/aquaculturecenter/documents/Carnivorous - Fish.pdf
(saying improvements in salmon farming methods have decreased employment
opportunities, while "lower production and market prices... have contributed to financial
instability in salmon fishing fleets," forcing many fishers out of business "with dramatically
negative effects on the economies of rural coastal communities.")
45. Eilperin, supra note 34, at A04 (saying the cost of farmed salmon has dropped
from approximately seven dollars per pound to two dollars per pound). But see Wilson,
supra note 36, at 497 (saying "[d]espite aquaculture's contribution to the world's fish
supply, the retail cost of fish has not decreased" because of demand outpacing supply,
declining wild fisheries, high operational costs in a "new" industry, and the willingness of
some "to pay exorbitant prices" for some species like salmon and shrimp).
46. Craig, supra note 5, at 166, n.ll (quoting UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO,
Introduction, in NOAA'S AQUACULTURE POLICY (1998),
http://swr.ucsd.edu/fmd/bill/aquapol.htm).
47. Eilperin, supra note 34, at A04. See also Firestone & Barber, supra note 6, at 708
(noting fish landings leveled off during the 1990s to eighty-five to ninety-five million
metric tons a year). One Canadian company, New Brunswick's Cooke Aquaculture,
processes 100,000 pounds of farmed fish per day, seven days a week and, within twenty-
four hours, can transport it anywhere in the United States. Eilperin, supra note 34, at A04.
48. Firestone & Barber, supra note 5, at 706.
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products." Worldwide, the aquaculture industry is worth $40
billion.5"
In the United States, the industry is worth "nearly" one billion
dollars "' and, in North America, has increased in size an average
of 3.6% per year from 1984 to 2001.52 This is so, even though the
United States' aquaculture industry "supplies less than 10% of the
nation's seafood demands.""3 The vast majority of this increase in
sales was from farmed fish like Atlantic and Pacific salmon and
shrimp. 4 As of 1997, the aquaculture industry consisted of
approximately 5000 aquaculture facilities located in every state and
territory.5 It is one of "several growing segments" of domestic
agriculture. 6 Some predict that aquaculture will supply up to 25%
of all seafood consumed in this country in the next twenty years.
Reflecting the importance of aquaculture to the country's
economy, the federal government is actively encouraging the
industry's development.58 The U.S. Department of Commerce is
49. Id.
50. Craig, supra note 5, at 166.
51. Id. at 167.
52. Firestone & Barber, supra note 5, at 706. The global average aquaculture
production increased at a yearly rate of nine percent during the same time period. Id.
53. Craig, supra note 5, at 167 (quoting OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, Aquaculture, in
TURNING TO THE SEA: AMERICA'S OCEAN FUTURE, available at
http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/oceanreport/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2006)). The United
States is eleventh in the world in aquaculture production, Firestone & Barber, supra note
5, at 707, producing 1 to 2% of the world's total, Eilperin, supra note 22, at A04.At the
same time, it ranks third in the consumption of seafood. Firestone & Barber, supra note 6,
at 707.
54. Craig, supra note 5, at 167-68. Other aquaculture products include oysters, clams,
ornamental fish, baitfish, and crustaceans. Id. As an illustration of the growing importance
of the industry, see the six-page advertisement in the New York Times touting the
advantages of ocean farmed salmon. Ocean-Farmed Salmon: A Healthy Choice for Our Times
and Your Table, N. Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 4, 2005, at 91-96.
55. Craig, supra note 5, at 168. Sixty-eight percent of aquaculture acreage is in the
south, and the south "account[s] for 65% of the value of aquaculture products sold." Id.
The north-central states are the least active aquaculture area of the country. Id. at 168-69.
56. Id. at 168.
57. See Press Release, Sea Grant, supra note 41, at 1 (saying that aquaculture has the
"potential to supply up to 25 percent of all seafood consumed by its citizens within the
next 20 years"). According to an article in the Washington Post, by 2025 one half of the
fish consumed worldwide will be farm-raised. Eilperin, supra note 22, at A04.
58. See Craig, supra note 5, at 169-170 (describing various federal initiatives like the
1980 National Aquaculture Development Act, amended in 1985, and federal agency
funding initiatives like National Sea Grant College Program funding that develops
technology, the impact of which totals $100 million per year and provides thousands of
jobs).
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"promoting a five-fold increase in U.S. aquaculture production" by
2025. 5' Towards the end of the last century, the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) spent nearly ten million dollars annually
for "the operation of 25 major salmon hatcheries in the Columbia
River Basin" and almost twenty million dollars for "salmon
enhancement projects in Alaska." 60 In FY1994 and FY1995, the
Northeast Fishing Industry Grants program gave a total of $3.39
million for "aquaculture-related projects" for the purpose of
"creating commercial development opportunities for displaced
New England fishermen."61 In its 2001 Fisheries Strategic Plan,
NOAA cited as the "fourth objective" for sustainable fisheries the
promotion of the development of "robust and economically sound
aquaculture."
6 2
While the United States freshwater aquaculture industry is
booming,63 the coastal or nearshore industry is not; it currently
provides only 15% of total domestic aquaculture production.' One
of the first commercial open-ocean aquaculture operations began
in 2001 with the transfer of what had been a public project in the
waters off Hawaii to a private firm.65  Most other offshore
aquaculture activities are "in the pilot project stage."66 These
include a single net pen next to a Gulf of Mexico oil platform and
federally supported experiments off the coasts of Hawaii and
Massachusetts.67  While, at present, there are "no wholly
59. Firestone & Barber, supra note 5, at 709. This is roughly 2.2 million tons more
seafood than the country now produces. Eilperin, supra note 22, at A04.
60. Craig, supra note 5, at 170.
61. Id.
62. Craig, supra note 5, at 170 (quoting NOAA, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FISHERIES
STRATEGIC PLAN (2001)). Craig notes, in support of the fourth objective, NOAA "promised
to (1) promote the commercial rearing of at least seven new species [of fish]; (2) reduce
the time and cost of permitting environmentally sound aquaculture ventures"; as well as
"identify areas in coastal waters and the EEZ suitable for environmentally sound
aquaculture development." Id. at 170-71 n.36.
63. During the last two decades of the last century, U.S. aquaculture production rose
approximately 400%, to almost $1 billion. U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY FINAL
REPORT, supra note 3, at 330.
64. Id. Firestone and Barber disagree with this estimate and say that, by 1997, marine
aquaculture was 40% of the North American aquaculture production, noting particularly
the "explosive" growth in Atlantic salmon mariculture. Firestone & Barber, supra note 5, at
707.
65. U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 332.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 332, 335; Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 270 (describing these early offshore
aquaculture efforts and saying there are experimental offshore fish farms growing scallops,
flounder, Pacific threadfin, and red snapper, which have "partial federal research
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commercial aquaculture operations" " in the EEZ, this is expected
to change "dramatically in the next two decades" because of
federally supported "intensive" research and development
initiatives and financial support from Congress.69
C. The Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts of Near and Off-Shore
Fish Farming
The oceans are in crisis, and what's their response? To allow
the enormous expansion of this industry [aquaculture] that's
proven to have a negative environmental impact. 7
Despite its potentially positive features, non-land based
aquaculture is not a benign activity from an environmental
perspective. While moving these activities farther offshore may
reduce or even eliminate some of these adverse impacts, other
adverse impacts will remain the same and new ones may be
created. In addition, the growth of either a nearshore or offshore
fish farming industry threatens the economic stability of traditional
fishers and their communities as much as the declining fish
populations do.
1. Adverse environmental impacts of non-land-based aquaculture.
A typical aquaculture facility, whether located in coastal or
ocean waters, consists of "cages, net pens, and nursery boxes."'"
The young fish, which are used to stock these facilities, are
generally reared in freshwater hatcheries then moved to net pens
anchored on the floor of a coastal bay or the ocean. 2 There, the
small fish grow to market size. 3 Although to date, the most likely
sponsorship").
68. Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 270. However, Schatzberg notes that competition
with established foreign coastal fish farms with lower labor costs and less regulatory
constraints may inhibit the growth of domestic ocean fish ranching. Id. at 270-71.
69. Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1204. The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy
identified as one of its recommendations "the development of an economically and
environmentally sound marine aquaculture industry." U.S. COMMISSION ON OCFAN POLICY
REPORT, supra note 3, at 330. See also the half page advertisement" Salmon of the
Americas" in the New York Times touting ocean-farmed salmon for being "Good for You"
and "Good for the Oceans." N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at A19.
70. Gerry Leape, Vice President for Marine Conservation at the National
Environmental Trust, quoted in Eilperin, Without Barbs, supra note 34, at A-1.
71. Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1193.
72. Id. at 1193 n.41.
73. Id.
20071
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candidate species for ocean fish ranching in the United States EEZ
is salmon, other species, such as summer flounder, Pacific
threadfin, sea scallops, and Atlantic cod, are also being
considered.74
Among the potential adverse impacts of cultivating fish in pens
in open water, regardless of whether these waters are near or
offshore, are the spread of diseases, such as sea lice and salmon
anemia, 5 to wild fish stocks; genetic contamination of those stocks,
perhaps reducing their ability to survive in the wild; and
competition between either native or exotic species and wild fish
for food and habitat.76 Genetic contamination and competition
with native species are of particular concern when farmed species
escape from their pens (disease is easily spread even without
escape in some cases)," further imperiling wild stock recovery
efforts. The potential of escaped fish to dilute the genetic
74. Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 251 n.8. See also Florence Fabricant, Cod Returns to
These Shores, This Time By Boat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at F6 (reporting on importation
to the United States of parasite free cod from net pens in waters offshore of the Shetland
Islands, raised without antibiotics, pesticides or dyes, and fed by products made from wild
herring and mackerel); Paul Greenberg, Green to the Gills: Is There a Way to Farm-Raise Fish
that Helps Save the Oceans, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 18, 2006, at 54 (reporting on efforts in
Norway to farm cod).
75. Sea lice eat salmon flesh and salmon anemia kills salmon. See Eilperin, supra note
34, at A-i (saying in 2002 one Maine fish farm killed over 1.5 million fish in an effort to
contain the disease); Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1196-97 (reporting "disease and parasite
outbreaks in aquaculture facilities are becoming commonplace," and saying both can be
spread through exposure to infected fish parts, "blood water from harvesting operations,
improper handling and disposal of dead fish, and the movement of personnel and
equipment between multiple aquaculture facilities.")
76. See Firestone & Barber, supra note 5, at 694-95 (listing among the impacts of "sea-
based fish farming... introduction of exotic species or varieties of fish to new bodies of
water, genetic contamination of the wild genome, predation on wild fish, competition with
wild fish for food and favorable space, disruptive behavior, stimulation of premature
migrations, creation of unacceptably high densities of fish, mixed-stock exploitation
problems, predator attraction, and disease and parasite transmission").
77. Firestone and Barber explain that escape of maiculture fish occurs either
through "leakage" ("the escape of a small number of fish during normal operations") or
"through catastrophic events," like the escape of approximately 100,000 non-North
American Atlantic salmon from a net pen off the Maine coast in December 2000. Firestone
& Barber, supra note 5, at 710. See also Eilperin, supra note 34, at A-i (reporting that in
2004 a researcher with the Atlantic Salmon Federation found eight times as many escaped
cultivated salmon in a New Brunswick river as wild salmon).
78. See generally Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 255 (saying "[T]he foremost concern for
those looking into the negative environmental impacts of salmon farming on the West
Coast is the fear of biological pollution in the form of escaping salmon.") See also Firestone
& Barber, supra note 6, at 715 (saying hatchery-reared fish used as feedstock for
mariculture operations bred with aggressive feeding behaviors so they grow quickly are
particularly problematic for wild stock when they escape because they may "out-compete
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material of wild stock is especially high where the wild species is
threatened and, therefore, less able to withstand the influence.79
There is also concern that escaped, non-native fish may
successfully spawn in rivers traditionally occupied by wild fish and,
if successful, may colonize those waters." The escape of Atlantic
salmon from net pens "is apparently routine.'81
Fish wastes, dead fish, uneaten food, and antibiotics and
hormones used to promote growth may contaminate the quality of
the water surrounding the net pens." Nutrients84 and chemical
wild fish in certain situations, with no hope of later completing the salmon life cycle"
because they have not been imprinted with information about where they must return to
spawn).
79. Firestone & Barber, supra note 5, at 711.
80. Id. at 712 (discussing the spawning success of Atlantic salmon which have
escaped from net pens in the Pacific northwest to spawn in British Columbia, posing a
"potential to be an unmitigated disaster... where Pacific salmon are already in severe
decline due to overfishing and habitat destruction"); see also Englebrecht, supra note 4 at
1196 (saying in the last ten years almost one million mature Atlantic salmon escaped from
Pacific Northwest aquaculture pens, since 1987 Canadian and U.S. fishermen caught
approximately 19,000 of these fish in the ocean off the Pacific coast, including 200 in 2001
alone, and in the same period Alaskan fishermen caught almost 600 adult Atlantic salmon,
including one in the Bering Sea); Eilperin, supra note 34, at A-4 (reporting industry
officials say the number of escaped Atlantic salmon in British Columbia dropped from
89,000 in 1998 to 2,500 in 2004).
81. Firestone & Barber, supra note 5, at 711; id. (saying when the number of escaped
fish "are compared to the numbers of wild fish returning to spawn, it is easy to see why a
great deal of concern has been focused on the impact of mariculture escapees on wild
Atlantic salmon.") See also Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1194 (saying "fish escapes are
inevitable"). Firestone and Barber attribute the "accelerated decline" in wild Atlantic
salmon populations in the past thirty years from their historic abundance to salmon
mariculture, over-fishing, diversion of water from salmon rivers, toxic pollution,
acidification, deforestation, and the introduction of exotic species, like the brown trout,
which prey on juvenile salmon. They say "not all" of the salmon populations found today
in many of the major river systems in New England "are wild" and can only be maintained
through restocking with fry from hatcheries, and that today the total return of both wild
and hatchery-reared Atlantic salmon to the waters of the United States is a little over a
thousand fish. Firestone & Barber, supra note 5, at 687, 698-702.
82. See Eilperin, supra note 34, at A-i (salmon wastes off of the British Columbia
coast release an amount of excess nitrogen equivalent to that released by sewage from a
city of 250,000 people). Environmentalists describe ocean aquaculture as "floating pig
farms." Mark Dowie, Terms of Art, Salmon and the Caesar: Will a Doctrine from the Roman Empire
Sink Ocean Aquaculture? LEGAL AFF. (Sept./Oct. 2004), at 3, http://www.legalaffairs.org.
83. See Rosamond L. Naylor & Rebecca J. Goldberg, Nature's Subsidies to Shrimp and
Salmon Farming, 282 SCIENCE 883 (1998) ("The ocean's capacity to assimilate wastes and
maintain viable fish populations is being challenged by aquaculture's continued growth."),
quoted in Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1193; see also U.S. Public Interest Research Group v.
Stolt Sea Farm, Inc., 2002 WL 240386 (D. Me. Feb. 19, 2002) (holding aquaculture
facilities are point sources under Clean Water Act because they discharge pollutants,
including escaped non-native fish); accord U.S. Public Interest Research Group v. Heritage
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pollutants from these facilities are discharged directly into the
ocean, unfiltered. 5 Fish feces and uneaten food can build up
beneath the floating pens and create "bacteria mats" on the ocean
floor, posing an additional threat to marine life. 6
Furthermore, the practice of harvesting wild fish, which are
already under traditional fishing pressure,87 to feed cultivated fish
"directly and immediately impact[s] the marine habitat.""8 It
"typically" takes "two to five kilograms of wild-caught fish,
processed into fish meal and fish oil for feed," to produce one
kilogram of farmed marine fish.89 This pressure on small fish like
Salmon, Inc., 2002 WL 240440 (D. Me. Feb. 19, 2002). The discharge of certain pollutants
into net pens is allowed so long as water quality standards are met and no ecological or
human health problems are created. This discharge has been permitted "to determine the
feasibility of using pollutants to grow aquatic organisms." Tim Eichenberg & Barbara
Vestal, Improving the Legal Framework for Marine Aquaculture: The Role of Water Quality Laws
and the Public Trust Doctrine, 2 TERR. SEA. J. 339, 393 (1992) (citing 40 CFR §§ 125.10-11).
But see generally Firestone & Barber, supra note 6, at 730 (arguing escaped fish should be
treated as pollutants and their discharge regulated under the Clean Water Act, and being
encouraged by EPA's "cautious step" in 2002 issuing proposed effluent guidelines for
aquaculture activities that require operators of "certain net pen systems" to "develop and
implement [best management] practices ["BMPs"] to minimize the potential
[unintended] escape of non-native species").
84. See Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1193-94 (saying excess nutrients stimulate
phytoplankton growth, depleting oxygen levels in water, stressing or killing fish and other
aquatic species, or leading to toxic algae blooms, like red tides and pfiesteria, causing large
fish kills, contaminating shellfish, and threatening human health); see also Craig, supra
note 5, at 199 (saying the number of eutrophic and/or hypoxic areas in ocean waters off
of the United States coastline is increasing).
85. Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1193. See also Firestone & Barber, supra note 6, at
711 (listing among the pollutants discharged from mariculture operations copper to
control the growth of marine algae on fish pens, fish food (including biological wastes
from the chicken industry, antibiotics, and added pigments to color salmon flesh pink),
fish wastes, a variety of diseases, viruses, parasites, and chemicals including antibiotics and
biocides).
86. Eilperin, supra note 34, at A-4. See also Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1194 (saying
NMFS "consider[s]" that these mats "present the most risk to aquatic habitat").
87. See generally, U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at
331.
88. Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1197. See also Craig, supra note 5, at 171-72 (noting
the "perverse" impact on wild fish stocks of using wild fish to feed carnivorous marine fish,
like salmon, tuna, cod, and sea bass); Schatzberg, supra note 6, at 254 (saying "only if the
amount of fish meal and fish oil declines can salmon aquaculture truly contribute to the
aggregate global fish supply," and saying also developing countries "can actually lose food
resources to aquaculture" because the constituents of fish food "come from small fish
caught in the waters off these nations").
89. Craig, supra note 5, at 172. See also Rosamond L. Naylor et al., Aquaculture - A
Gateway for Exotic Species, 294 SCIENCE 1655, 1656 (2001) ("in 1997 about 1.8 million tons of
wild fish for feed were required to produce 644,000 metric tons of Atlantic salmon - a
2.8:1 ratio"), quoted by Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1197. Craig, supra note 5, at 172 also
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anchovies reduces a critically important source of food for wild
stock, as well as for marine mammals and seabirds, 90 and disrupts
the traditional prey food chain. Also, when wild, instead of
hatchery-reared, fish are used to stock these operations, the
populations of those species are further depleted.9
Marine mammals, such as sea lions, attracted by the farmed
fish may become entangled in coastal net pens.9 2 The construction
of support facilities, like fish processing and canning operations,
can destroy wetland and coastal habitats and can themselves be a
source of pollutants into the nearshore environment.9"
Additionally, the placement and construction of aquaculture
structures like anchors, cages, and net pens, "directly alter" habitat
for wild fisheries and, when placed in spawning rivers, can
adversely affect the migration and habitat of anadromous fish.94
There may also be adverse human health effects associated with
the consumption of farmed salmon. A study published in the
journal Science last year found sufficiently elevated levels of PCBs,
dioxin, and other carcinogens in farmed salmon to warrant a
recommendation that consumers limit themselves to one eight
ounce portion of farmed salmon per month. 5 These contaminants
bioaccumulate and become more potent as one moves up the food
chain. There are additional concerns about the amount of
antibiotics and hormones fed to farmed fish, such as salmon, and
how those may affect human health.96
notes it is "non-carnivorous species such as marine mollusks and carps [that] account for
most of the current net gain in world fish supplies from aquaculture," citing ROSAMOND L.
NAYLOR ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, A WATERSHED ACADEMY WEB
STEPPING STONE TO LEARNING-EFFECTS OF AQUAcULTURE ON WORLD FISH SUPPLIES,
http://www.epa.gov/watertrain/step8aabstr.html.
90. Craig, supra note 5, at 172. See also Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1197-98 (quoting
Naylor & Goldberg as saying "because of their dependence on wild-caught fish, shrimp
and salmon aquaculture deplete rather than augment fisheries resources").
91. See also Greenberg, supra note 73, at 56 (saying "the overarching concern" of
fishers is "the entire reorganization and homogenization of the sea" that may result from
aquaculture's selective breeding of fish for the marketplace).
92. Weber, supra note 43, at 2.
93. Craig, supra note 5, at 172.
94. Englebrecht, supra note 5, at 1198.
95. Eilperin, supra note 34, at A-4. See also Weber, supra note 43, at 26 ("farmed
Atlantic salmon have low levels of omega-3 fatty acids and relatively high levels of omega-6
fatty acids, which can be problematic").
96. Ronald J. Rychlak & Ellen M. Peel, Swimming Past the Hook: Navigating Legal
Obstacles in the Aquaculture Industry, 23 ENVTL. L. 837, 863 (1993) (noting that the FDA has
approved only two antibiotics and one topical treatment for food fish diseases, and
bemoaning the slow pace at which the agency approves new drugs).
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2. Specific problems with offshore aquaculture.
Many of the environmental problems associated with coastal
fish farming can also occur when the activities are moved farther
offshore into the EEZ. In the open ocean, escaped fish can still be
disease vectors for wild fish, sea mammals, and sea birds, and can
adversely affect wild fish through competition and genetic
mutations. Also, even though the ocean is a larger sink in which to
disperse pollutants, the dispersed pollutants must go somewhere.
Instead of net pens posing a hazard to marine mammals, they now
pose a threat to offshore commercial navigation. Even if the pens
are submerged below the ocean's surface to decrease conflicts with
surface navigation, the wastes from these facilities may still form a
mat on the ocean floor, depending on the depth of the water in
which they are located, posing a hazard to bottom dwelling sea life
and find their way into the human food chain as wild fish gather
around the pens to consume the waste feed. Additionally, both
ocean storms, with their extreme wave activity and high winds, and
commercial navigation may pose threats to the security of pens
that are not submerged.9" Surface net pens, or those located just
below the surface, might experience sufficient damage under
certain conditions to allow the escape of fish.9" There are also
logistical problems associated with operating offshore aquaculture
facilities - moving workers to and from the net pens, maintaining
the net pens during adverse weather conditions - and the need to
place them at locations that do not pose barriers to navigation.99
3. Impacts on local fishers and fishing communities.
The natural environment is not the only thing that may be at
risk from ocean fish ranching. Ocean fishers may suffer as well.00
97. See Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 269 n.122 (discussing technological problems
associated with locating aquaculture facilities in "the harsher conditions in the open
ocean.")
98. But see Eilperin, supra note 34, at A-4 (reporting on the success of the University
of New Hampshire's Open Ocean Aquaculture project, which, in five years, has not had
one escaped cod, halibut, or haddock from its three galvanized steel cages six miles off the
New Hampshire coast, and where no environmental problems have been "detected").
99. U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 332. See also
Schatzberg, supra note 6, at 269 n.122 (saying "moving [aquaculture facilities] seaward
cannot fully eliminate user conflicts ... with the fishing industry, oil exploration firms, and
those navigating the EEZ").
100. See Eilperin, supra note 34, at A-4 (reporting that an Institute for Fisheries
Resources' lawyer who represents "wild-catch fishermen" says his clients "resent
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Fishers will lose access to offshore fishing grounds they have
traditionally fished for years-in some cases, these areas have been
fished for centuries.' They may also see the price of their harvests
go down as ranched fish flood the market at a lower cost.0 2 The
effects on individual fishermen may extend to their communities,
as reduced yields and depressed prices lead to a general economic
decline.
4. Some benefits from moving aquaculture to the open ocean.
While moving fish farming operations offshore may merely
transfer the problems of farming in coastal waters farther offshore
and create new problems, moving activities out of coastal waters
may also provide some benefits. For example, moving aquaculture
into the EEZ may avoid some water quality problems that make it
difficult to farm fish in coastal waters and eliminate aquaculture as
a source of pollution to these waters. Nonpoint source pollution,
carrying fertilizers, bacteria, pesticides, chemicals, and other toxic
pollutants into coastal waters, acid deposition from power plants, 10 3
and erosion causing turbidity and sediment loadings in adjacent
waters have made the nearshore environment inhospitable for
aquaculture.0 4 At the same time, as discussed above, fish farming
contributes pollution to those same waters through the discharge
of fish feces, antibiotics and hormones, pesticides, dead fish, and
aquaculture's impact on their hunting grounds" and complain that "[i]f you destroy the
environment and you destroy the wild fish, there won't be anything left to fish").
101. Jose L. Fernandez, Public Trust, Riparian Rights, and Aquaculture." A Storm Brewing
in the Ocean State, 20 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 293, 294 (1996) (warning against
the "potential for the alienation of the bay bottom to private owners, thereby dissipating a
public resource on which depend the exercise of historical rights").
102. See Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 265 (saying Alaskan commercial fishermen
"feared the economic impacts of competition with farmed salmon production"); id.
(explaining local Alaska fishermen's opposition to salmon farming in Alaskan state waters
came from their fear of large fishing companies "overtaking" their small boat operations);
see also Fernandez, supra note 100, at 297 (saying "[t]hose who exercise the right of free
fishery argue that aquaculture... may drive down the value of the harvest").
103. See generally CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS, DFO MARITIMES
REGIONAL HABITAT STATUS REPORT: THE EFFECTS OF ACID RAIN ON ATLANTIC SALMON OF
THE SOUTHERN UPLAND OF NOVA SCOTIA (2000); WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, THE STATUS OF
WILD ATLANTIC SALMON: A RIVER BY RIVER ASSESSMENT (2001),
http://www.worldwildlife.org/oceans/pdfs/atlantic salmon.pdf.
104. See generally, Craig, supra note 5, at 188-200 (describing terrestrial sources of
pollution adversely affecting nearshore aquaculture activities and calling for "a better
approach to regulating land-based pollution of the oceans, especially nonpoint source
water pollution").
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uneaten fish food, which spread disease and parasites and
adversely affect important aquatic habitat. According to Naylor
and Goldberg,
The increasing scale of these enterprises is now having
unforeseen ecological consequences. The conversion of coastal
ecosystems to aquaculture ponds destroys nursery areas that
support ocean fisheries. Fish farming degrades coastal waters
through discharge of nutrients and chemicals, and it disrupts
coastal ecosystems by the introduction of exotic species.' °5
Moving these activities farther offshore..6 will protect them
from nearshore pollution and at the same time may lessen their
direct impact on the coastal environment by dispersing the
pollutants in a larger area, assuming that ocean currents do not
redeposit the pollutants back into coastal waters."0 7
In addition, moving these activities away from the coast will also
reduce their visibility, perhaps lessening the opposition of coastal
residents to them,"0 ' and may make them less disturbing to coastal
commercial and recreational fishers."9  Moving aquaculture
offshore into the EEZ would also bring the United States "in line
with other nations" that are doing exactly that."0
However, as shown above, moving fish farms offshore merely
transfers many of their nearshore problems to deep water, and fish
farming's onshore socio-economic impacts on local fishers and
fishing communities remains the same regardless of where the
105. Rosamond L. Naylor & Rebecca J. Goldberg, Nature's Subsidies to Shrimp and
Salmon Farming, 282 SCIENCE 883, 883 (1998), quoted by Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1193.
106. According to Dowie, the Bush Administration proposes placing these facilities
in "the outermost 188 miles" of the 200-mile wide EEZ. Dowie, supra note 81, at 3.
107. But see Wilson, supra note 26, at 500-01 (describing transboundary problems
caused by escaped fish that cross national borders carrying diseases and competing with
wild fish for food, and saying even though aquaculture's "most acute environmental effects
are primarily local ... changes in local ecosystems can affect the ecosystem as a whole ...
[and] have "broader implications").
108. See Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 268 (saying that local government opposition to
expansion of shoreline aquaculture operations in response to pressure from resistant local
landowners concerned about aesthetics is fueling NOAA's enthusiasm for ocean fish
farming); Greenberg, supra note 73, at 56 (reporting that a combination of
environmentalists, fishers, and coastal residents "have kept aquaculture out of most state-
controlled waters" because of fear "that it could pollute the coastline and harm wild fish
populations").
109. U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 332.
110. Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 268.
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activity takes place. While fish farming may offer substantial
benefits, these do not come without serious associated costs.
In sum, aquaculture serves to enhance the nation's fisheries by
relieving pressure on the wild fish stocks from overfishing.
However, by impairing water quality, introducing exotic species
and diseases, extracting marine biomass, and directly altering
habitat and obstructing migration, aquaculture is increasingly
contributing to marine habitat loss - and consequently presents
an actual and significant threat to the nation's wild fisheries."
If anything, these costs are potentially greater, not less when
the activity is moved farther offshore because new risks are created
in addition to those that are simply transferred to an open water
environment.
Despite these concerns, many feel that ocean fish ranching will,
and should, develop given the need to meet the demand for fish
and growing opposition to aquaculture in coastal waters. Fueled by
the current downward spiral of wild fish stocks and the potential
profitability of the activity, it seems almost "inevitable" that the
industry will grow.1 2
D. Current Legal Framework
Despite a kaleidoscope of federal and state laws that might
apply to ocean fish ranching, a serious problem hindering the
industry's development is the lack of a coherent, comprehensive
regulatory regime." 3  The present framework for managing
commercial ocean fish ranching is characterized by "complex,
inconsistent, and overlapping policies and regulatory regimes
administered by numerous federal and state agencies.""' 4 This lack
of coherence is a serious barrier to the industry's growth and to its
potential to meet the country's growing demand for seafood.'1 5
The lack of a unified regulatory framework also makes it difficult
to address the potential environmental and economic harms that
111. Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1198.
112. Firestone & Barber, supra note 5, at 710.
113. See Craig, supra note 5, at 173 (quoting EPA's Office of Water saying "[n]o
comprehensive regulatory framework exists for permitting aquaculture operations").
114. U.S. COMMISSION ON OcEAN POLIcY FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 332. The
Commission calls this a "conundrum." Id.
115. Id. at 333 (saying the "mix of laws and regulations" means ocean ranching
applicants have "no guarantee of exclusive use of space in offshore areas" and makes
private capital, insurance coverage, and bank loans "difficult to obtain").
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aquaculture may produce."6
This lack of a comprehensive regulatory regime is not the
result of incomplete jurisdiction over ocean space. International
law gives the United States "complete sovereignty over the waters,
airspace, seabed, and subsoil" within its twelve-mile territorial
sea,1 7 subject only to the rights of ships to "innocent passage. " "' In
addition, the federal government has sovereign authority over the
EEZ.1l9
States also have jurisdiction over a portion of the EEZ and
exercise regulatory authority in their waters to protect important
state resources. Under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953
("SLA") ,120 coastal states have title to lands beneath and control
116. The 1980 National Aquaculture Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1988 & Supp. III
1991) (Westlaw 2006), did little to change this situation. The law merely stated that it was
in the national interest to encourage the development of aquaculture and commissions
the preparation of a national aquaculture development plan, id. at § 2801, and directs the
Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior to report to Congress on the federal
laws and regulations that impede the development of commercial aquaculture activities
together with recommendations on how they might be removed, id. at § 2804. Although a
National Aquaculture Development Plan was subsequently developed, the federal
government has not requested, nor has Congress appropriated, funds for its
implementation. Rychlak & Peel, supra note 95, at 841-42.
117. Craig, supra note 5, at 173-74.
118. Id. at 174 (citing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (UNCLOS)
III (1982), arts. 2.1, 2.2, 3, 17-25).
119. The UNCLOS III (1982) authorized signatory nations to claim jurisdiction over
an EEZ, and although the United States has not ratified the treaty, its legal position is that
the treaty's provisions are customary law. Craig, supra note 5, at 173 n.50. In 1983, the
United States claimed a 200 mile wide EEZ, and in 1988, President Reagan claimed a
twelve-mile territorial sea for the United States, also as authorized by UNCLOS III. Id. In
1999, President Clinton claimed a twenty-four mile wide contiguous zone for the United
States. Id. Prior to President Reagan's actions, Congress in the Bartlett Act, Pub. L. No. 89-
658, 1-4, 80 Stat. 908, 908 (1966), created a twelve-mile exclusive fishing zone around the
United States. Christie, supra note 12, at 112. While displacement of foreign fisheries from
EEZs by UNCLOS III "created the possibility for coastal states to address the 'tragedy of
the commons' within the EEZ," many nations saw this as "the opportunity to develop their
domestic industries." Christie, supra note 14, at 11; id. ("freedom of the high seas was
replaced by virtually open access for national fishermen"). Christie says since coastal states
have extended theirjurisdiction over EEZ fisheries, "worldwide marine catch has increased
from about 60 million tons" in the mid-1970s to "94.8 tons in 2000." Id. at 4. See also SPETH,
supra note 14, at 107 (saying nation states responded to the creation of exclusive economic
zones "by subsidizing new fishing fleets and neglecting needed regulation").
120. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1994) (Westlaw 2006), cited in Craig, supra
note 5, at 174 n.53. See also Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 234-35 (1845) (affirming
exclusive state jurisdiction over tidal waters and tidelands); Englebrecht, supra note 4, at
1234 (discussing SLA and noting Magnuson Act incorporated the SLA's jurisdictional
boundaries). Prior to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, states could regulate state-registered
fishing boats and fishermen fishing in what is now the EEZ. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313
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over coastal waters "at least three miles out to sea, subject to the
federal government's paramount rights ' 121 to regulate those waters
and lands for "commerce, navigation, national defense, and
international affairs.' ' 2 2 The SLA gives states title to, and the power
to "manage, administer, lease, develop, and use, natural
resources in their territorial seas. Among other marine life, the
SLA includes fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, and crabs in the
definition of "resources.' ' 24 States, therefore, have the power to
regulate mariculture activities that take place up to three miles
offshore, subject to federal preemption, and the federal
government has the power to regulate these activities outside state
waters to the outer perimeter of the EEZ. 125
Nor is the problem the absence of potentially applicable laws.
Indeed, there are many federal and state laws that could apply to
ocean fish ranching. 26 For example, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"), using its authority under section 402
of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") 127 to regulate discharges of
U.S. 69,77 (1941).
121. Craig, supra note 5, at 174 (citation omitted). See also Montserrat Gorina-Ysern,
supra note 9, at 663 (stating that through the 18'h century, the "limits of fishery rights were
those that could be enforced by the cannon-shot, commonly understood to reach out 3
miles from the shore (or 1 maritime league)").
122. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977) (quoting United
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 10 (1960)) (striking down Virginia law barring federally
licensed nonresident fishers from engaging in commercial fishing); Craig, supra note 5, at
174 n.54 (noting that Florida and Texas have historic claims to more ocean territory). See
also Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1234-35 (noting that the Supreme Court called the idea
of owning fish prior to their being reduced to possession by "skillful capture" a "legal
fiction," and that there could "be no question today" Congress has "power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate the taking of fish in state waters"). On the rule of capture
and its evolution from Roman to American law, see generally Blumm & Ritchie, supra note
18 (2005).
123. 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (Wesdaw 2006).
124. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (Westlaw 2006).
125. Craig, supra note 5, at 174. See Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1237-38 (explaining
how recent NMFS regulations limit the Agency's and Regional Councils' authority to
regulate non-Magnuson-Stevens fishing activities and those managed by state agencies).
126. This discussion does not include laws like the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (Westlaw 2006), which regulates the movement of
contaminated and "adulterated" products in interstate commerce, the use of chemicals
and antibiotics for use on human food products, and federal fish and shellfish inspection
programs or their state replicates. For information on those programs, see Rychlak & Peel,
supra note 95, at 861-67.
127. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Westlaw 2006). Therefore, EPA can require that fish ranchers
acquire a national pollution discharge elimination system (NPDES) permit prior to
discharging any pollutants from their facilities, and that these discharges conform to
regulatory limits once set. See Craig, supra note 5, at 183-84 (stating any aquaculture facility
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pollutants into waters over the outer continental shelf ("OCS"), 28
has defined concentrated aquatic animal production facilities
("CAAPFs") as point sources 29 and, in 2004, issued national
effluent guidelines 3 ' for commercial net pens or submerged cage
systems producing 100,000 pounds of fish or more. 3' EPA also has
authority under section 403 of the CWA to prohibit discharges into
the territorial seas, waters of the contiguous zone, and oceans
pursuant to a 402 permit unless they are in compliance with EPA's
regulatory guidelines. 13 2  EPA promulgated "ocean discharge
that is not subject to § 318 is "potentially" subject to § 402 as an aquatic animal production
facility). Section 318 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1328 (Westlaw 2006), creates a limited
exemption from section 402 for the discharge of specific pollutants from approved
aquaculture 'projects subject to federal or state NPDES permitting programs that use
recycled wastewater from industrial or municipal facilities. Craig, supra note 6, at 182. EPA
has issued guidelines under § 318 that exempt non-toxic aquaculture discharges from
technology-based effluent limitations. 40 C.F.R. § 125.10(c) (Westlaw 2006).
128. Within the context of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the "outer
continental shelf' includes all submerged lands outside the boundaries of lands which are
covered by navigable waters. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (Westlaw 2006). Section 502 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Westlaw 2006), defines "navigable waters" to include the
territorial seas and then defines "territorial seas" narrowly to include only those waters
where states have primary jurisdiction under the Submerged Lands Act. See 33 U.S.C. §
1362(8) (Westlaw 2006). However, nothing in § 502 restricts the agency's permitting
jurisdiction to the territorial seas, as it also applies to "waters of the United States," which
would include the waters of the EEZ. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Westlaw 2006).
129. 40 C.F.R. § 122.24 (Wesfiaw 2006).
130. 40 C.F.R.,§ 451 (Westlaw 2006). These guidelines focus on "management
practices" to "minimize the release of pollutants," such as "proper practices for feed
management, storage of drugs and pesticides to avoid spilling, disposal of feed bags, nets,
and other materials, as well as minimizing the discharge of dead animals or animal parts."
Odin Smith & Ann Powers, Emerging Ocean Issues 5 (Nov. 7, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). See also Linda Roeder, EPA Finalizes Regulation on
Discharges from Fish Farms, Other Aquaculture Sites, 35 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1826-27 (Aug. 27,
2004) (describing the effluent guidelines). In May of 2006, EPA issued a "Compliance
Guide for the Concentrated Aquatic Animal Production Point Source Category,"
describing the "legally binding statutory provisions and rules" permit writers must apply
when they write NPDES permits for wastewater discharges from concentrated aquatic
animal production facilities and commercial fish farms. Amena H. Saiyid, EPA Releases
Guide for Permit Writers to Ensure Fish Farms Meet Effluent Limits, 37 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1119
(May 26, 2006).
131. 40 C.F.R. § 451.1-.24 (Westlaw 2006). The effluent guidelines apply to
commercial and noncommercial fish farms, hatcheries, and other aquatic facilities,
producing 100,000 pounds or more of aquatic animals in flow-through, recirculating, net
pens or submerged cage systems. 40 C.F.R. § 122.24; 40 C.F.R. § 122, app. C; 40 C.F.R. §
451.1-.24. (Westlaw 2006). See Smith & Powers, supra note 129, at 5 n.9. Regulations define
net pen systems as "a stationary, suspended or floating system of nets, screens, or cages in
open waters of the United States. Net pen systems typically are located along a shore or
pier or may be anchored and floating offshore." 40 C.F.R. § 451.2(j) (Westlaw 2006).
132. 33 U.S.C. 1343(a) (Westlaw 2006).
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criteria," under Section 403 in 1980.' Amendments to these
guidelines have been pending since 2001, but have not been
finalized."' EPA can also regulate the use of pesticides at these
aquaculture facilities under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act.135
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has authority under section
10 of the Rivers & Harbors Act' to require ocean fish ranchers to
get a permit to locate their facilities in navigable waters. The Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act 37 extended the Corps' permitting
authority to include offshore facilities related to energy extraction
located in the EEZ. s The National Oceanic, Atmospheric
Administration ("NOAA") has asserted that offshore aquaculture
facilities are subject to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
& Management Act' when they use any harvesting or support
vessels. 4 ' The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and the U.S. National
133. See40 C.F.R. § 125.120 (Westlaw 2006).
134. Craig, supra note 5, at 178-79 n.85, 200 (stating that EPA was poised to issue new
ocean discharge criteria in early 2001 developed under the prior Administration that
would have set baseline standards consisting of both a narrative statement of desired water
quality and pollutant specific numeric criteria and that would have applied to all permits
for discharges into the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, and the EEZ, but that the Bush
Administration blocked their publication and have not published new proposed criteria).
135. 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)-(y) (Westlaw 2006) (prohibiting, among other things,
pesticide use in a way inconsistent with labeling restrictions).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (westlaw 2006) (requiring permit to place structures in
navigable waters).
137. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (Westlaw 2006).
138. Schatzberg argues that this permitting authority extends to the EEZ under the
OCSLA. See Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 258. See also id. (stating that the OCSLA "does not
provide a clear environmental mandate to underlie permitting decisions").
139. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (Westlaw 2006) (establishing a comprehensive
management structure regulating commercial fishing through a system of regional
councils).
140. See generally U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 271-72.
For a discussion on whether the Magnuson Act confers regulatory authority over ocean
fish ranching on the EEZ, see Firestone & Barber, supra note 5, at 734-35 n.241 ("There is
some question whether, as a matter of law, the Magnuson Act actually confers on NOAA,
NMFS, and the regional Fisher Management Councils the power to regulate
aquaculture."); Englebrecht, The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Act, supra note 4, at
1188-89 (describing the Magnuson-Stevens Act's application to aquaculture as "minimal
and inconsistent," and noting importance of resolving any question about its application
to aquaculture activities in the EEZ because the essential fish habitat (EFH) provisions of
the SFA make mandatory application of conservation measures to fishing activities in
EFHs). Englebracht also says that NMFS "has classified aquaculture as both 'fishing' and
'non-fishing,'... [,] has chosen not to adopt any conservation measures for aquaculture
ventures that are adversely affecting designated EFH[s]," and has limited the Regional
Councils' "authority to regulate 'fishing' activities" affecting EFHs designated within state
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Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") share authority to regulate
offshore ocean ranching activities that might involve species or
areas protected under the Endangered Species Act, 4' the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, 14 2 and the Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act ("Ocean Dumping Act").1*s The U.S. Coast
Guard can require that navigational lights and signals be attached
to ocean ranching facilities and can establish a zone to protect
them and any ships in the area.' 44 The Food and Drug
Administration regulates the addition of additives, like dyes and
antibiotics, to food through the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.'45
To the extent that federal permits apply to ocean fish ranching,
the permitting agencies' obligations under the National
Environmental Policy Act also apply.'46
States also have, a variety of ways that they can regulate ocean
fish ranching activities that occur in their waters.'47 For example,
section 401 of the CWA authorizes states to certify that federally
permitted activities are in compliance with their water quality
waters. Id. at 1189-90. On the topic of EFHs, Christie says the breadth of the term's
definition in the SFA "could lead to the entire EEZ being designated EFH" thus
"compromising" the term's "usefulness ... as a management tool". Christie, supra note 12,
at 145.
141. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (Westlaw 2006) (prohibiting the take of listed
endangered species and placing an affirmative obligation on federal agencies not to
jeopardize their continued existence). If imported exotic species are used in fish ranching,
the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (Westlaw 2006), which makes
it a crime to import or acquire any fish in violation of any law that might be injurious to
humans, or wildlife resources, might apply because of the harm that escaped fish might
cause to native species. See Rychlak & Peel, supra note 97, at 857-58 (discussing potential
application of Lacey Act to Grass Carp and Tilapia because of their "rapid" reproductive
capabilities).
142. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (Westlaw 2006) (protecting marine mammals and
regulating their take).
143. Pub. L. No. 95-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified in scattered sections of 33 and 16
U.S.C.) (regulating the dumping of any materials into ocean waters and preventing or
strictly limiting the dumping of any material that could adversely affect human health or
amenities or the marine environment).
144. U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 101.
145. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (Westlaw 2006) (prohibiting contaminated or adulterated
food in interstate commerce, including fish products containing chemical residues in
unsafe amounts). See Rychlak & Peel, supra note 97, at 861-62.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Westlaw 2006) (mandating the preparation of an
environmental impact statement for all federal activities significantly affecting the human
environment).
147. See generally Rychlak & Peel, supra note 95 (discussing the application of various
state laws to terrestrial or nearshore aquaculture).
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standards. 48 This could mean that, even if ocean fish ranching
activities occur outside territorial waters, if the waters of the
adjacent coastal state are adversely impacted, 401 may be
triggered. Section 307 of the Coastal Zone Management Act
requires applicants for federal permits to demonstrate the
consistency of their authorized activities with state coastal zone
management plans. 14 Even though the CZMA "does not explicitly
mention aquaculture or mariculture," some states have relied on
the Act's general policies to initiate "CZMA-related regulatory
projects" governing these activities."' For example, Mississippi has
developed aquaculture net pen guidelines, Rhode Island has
developed "a marine aquaculture management plan and
geographic information system," and Virginia has developed and
implemented "a marine aquaculture regulatory and leasing
program.' ' 51 "Alaska has banned Atlantic salmon aquaculture" in
its waters, "Washington has banned the use of certain antibiotics"
in aquaculture operations, and "Maryland has placed a
moratorium on the introduction of genetically engineered fish
into its waterways." 152 Some states have laws regulating activities in
their territorial waters, like Alaska's rules regulating the
transportation of live fish, which might impede ocean fish
ranching.'53
Despite this impressive array of laws that might be applied to
ocean ranching in the EEZ, there is no comprehensive regulatory
program that does apply,'54 and there are many gaps in the
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (Westlaw 2006) (requiring federal CWA permit applicants to
receive state certification that the proposed discharges do not interfere with the state's
water quality standards and comply with federal law).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (Westlaw 2006). States may also issue permits, licenses, and
leases for coastal and ocean aquaculture projects within their waters. See also section 318(c)
of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §1328(c) (Westlaw 2006) authorizing states with approved
aquaculture programs to issue permits for the discharge of specific pollutants from
approved aquaculture projects. Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1199.
150. Craig, supra note 5, at 175-76.
151. Id. at 176-77.
152. Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1201.
153. See generally Rychlak & Peel, supra note 95 (describing state regulations that
apply to aquaculture activities).
154. The Commission on Ocean Policy called for the development of a new marine
aquaculture management framework, which among other things should take "into
account other traditional, existing, and proposed uses of the nation's ocean resources." See
U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 333. In response, the Bush
Administration issued a U.S. Ocean Action Plan directing NOAA to develop a program to
regulate offshore aquaculture activities, which led to the introduction of the National
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potential federal regulatory net.5 5 For example, there is no clear
regulatory authority over the design of net pens to assure that no
farmed fish escape or that no sea mammal entanglements occur,
nor is there any clear authority to prohibit the escape of ranched
fish 156 or to impose restitution requirements in the event of harm
from ocean fish ranching operations. While NMFS has
"acknowledged" the existence of these "gaps" and its responsibility
"to oversee aquaculture's impact on the marine environment," the
agency has done little that is meaningful to close them.'57 State laws
cannot fill the regulatory gaps because they cannot address
migratory species adequately, their extension to the federal waters
of the EEZ is vulnerable to a preemption challenge,5 5 and states
Offshore Aquaculture Act of 2005, S. 1195, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill provides for the
leasing of submerged lands in the EEZ for aquaculture activities and grants the Secretary
of Commerce authority to develop a permitting program for those activities. The bill,
however, left intact other competing legislative authorities, suggesting only that agencies
coordinate among themselves. See Smith & Powers, supra note 129, at 4.
155. Any thought that article 61 of UNCLOS III, requiring coastal states to "adopt
measures to prevent overexploitation . . . and maintain and restore stocks to produce
'maximum sustainable yield,"' Christie, supra note 14, at 5-6, might lead to conservation of
fisheries resources within the EEZ has not come to pass, and "problems of overfishing,
overcapitalization, single-species management, insufficient scientific data, and excessive
bycatch persist within the EEZ," id. at 17. See also Christie, supra note 12, at 132-33
(discussing concept of maximum sustained yield, its strengths and weaknesses). Christie
finds some hope in changes in the international legal regime affecting fisheries, such as
adoption of ecosystem principles, protection of biodiversity, principles of sustainability,
and ecosystem management. Id. at 135-36. She hopes that coastal states will incorporate
these principles into their domestic laws and cites particularly the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement as providing incentives for coastal states to adopt and apply them to straddling
stocks within the EEZ. Id. Steinberg suggests that "the goal of 'sustainability" should not
only refer to ecological systems, but also to the "sustainability of economic and social
communities." Phillip E. Steinberg, Fish or Foul: Investigating the Politics of the Marine
Stewardship Council, Conference on Marine Environmental Politics in the 21" Century, at 2,
available at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/macarthur/marine/papers/steinberg-l.html,
cited by Gorina-Ysern, supra note 9, at 705. On the history and use of the precautionary
principle, see Robert V. Percival, Who's Afraid of the Precautionary Principle, 23 PACE ENVrL. L.
REv. 21 (2005-06).
156. But see generally Firestone & Barber, supra note 5 (arguing that under some
circumstances escaped fish can be considered "pollutants" within the meaning of the
CWA).
157. Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1205. Englebrecht reports that NMFS, in 2002,
proposed a "voluntary" Code of Conduct for Responsible Aquaculture in the U.S.
Exclusive Economic Zone, which he recommends be incorporated into the agency's
enforceable regulations under its Magnuson-Stevens Act authority. Id. at 1205-07. See also
Thompson, supra note 8, at 248-49 (explaining how "fishing interests" have fought
incorporating more meaningful management and enforcement provisions into the
Magnuson Act and how these same interests "have worked to undermine effective
implementation of the Act").
158. Where state law directly conflicts with federal law, under the Supremacy Clause
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are more likely to let economic pressure lessen their regulatory
zeal in efforts to attract new aquaculture operations.
51
Given the rapid growth of the nearshore aquaculture industry,
the push to expand into the waters of the EEZ is understandable.
However, it is also very troubling because there is no
comprehensive, effective federal regulatory framework for
managing ocean fish ranching and no promise of one on the
immediate horizon. One alternative to an absence of effective
regulation is to allow the marketplace to function."6 The next
section of the article examines the effect of allowing the market
place to function on fish ranches in the EEZ.
III. PRIVATIZING COMMON POOL RESOURCES TO PROTECT THEM
A. The Ocean as a Common Pool Resource
The sea is common to all because it is so limitless that it cannot
become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the
use of all, whether we consider it from the point of view of
navigation or of fisheries. 1 '
The oceans are a giant global commons."' They belong to
of the Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2, state law is preempted. State law may also be preempted
where the federal regulatory scheme is sufficiently pervasive and detailed to effectively
"occupy the regulatory field" or the federal interest in the area that the state law is
regulating is "'so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject."' GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET
AL.,,FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAw 207 (5' ed. 2001). Finally, state regulation
may be precluded when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state regulation at
the same time, or where state law "interferes with the accomplishment" of some
congressional policy objective. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 315 (2d ed. 2006).
159. Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1201. See also Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation
Continuum, supra note 6, at 353 (noting the likelihood that "[s]tate and local governments
will under invest in information of broad interest that cannot be captured exclusively for
the investing jurisdiction," and commenting on the difficulty of achieving "horizontal
cooperation among states to gather such information").
160. See JAN G. LAITOS ET AL.,NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 6 (1st ed. 2006) (saying
there are "[t]wo allocation mechanisms" for "allocating scarce resources" markets and
governments).]
161. Hugo Grotius, MARE LIBERUAM 28 n. 3 (1608), referenced by Gorina-Ysern, supra
note 9, at 661.
162. But see Carol Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing
Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 45, 72 (1999) (saying "[t]he very idea of the common itself is
enormously variegated" and rejecting the idea that there is a "single commons or even a
few global commons," finding instead "a tapestry of constituent large and small commons,
interacting and overlapping in ways that are as subtle as the environment itself")
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everyone (res communis) 6 and have been considered open to all
for navigation, commerce, and recreation since the time of
Grotius.'" The resources in them are available to all for the
taking.165 The fact that the United States has extended its
sovereignty 200 miles from its coastline does not transform in any
way the open character of these waters or the communal nature of
the resources."
Neither the commons nor its resources have been reduced to
private ownership.'67 Although fishermen hold many rights such as
(emphasis original).
163. See Gorina-Ysern, supra note 9, at 663-64 (saying the debate over whether the
ocean and its resources should be considered res nullius ("belonging to no one" and thus
open to "individual appropriation") or res communis (open . . . [and] belonging to
everyone, and incapable of appropriation") was resolved in UNCLOS III in favor of res
communis). See also Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public
Trust: The American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 677-79
(2005) (explaining various categories of property under Roman law and distinguishing
between res publicae (things owned by the state), res communes (things owned in common,
like air, rivers, and the sea), and res nullius (things owned by no one and thus" capable of
individual appropriation").
164. See Gorina-Ysern, supra note 9, at 657-60 (discussing Grotius' MARE LIBERUM); see
also McCay, The Culture of the Commoners, in The QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 1,
at 206 (saying Grotius "original learned argument for the freedom of the seas was based
on a theory of property that justified the creation of private property only when one
person's activities might endanger another's"); Macinko, Public or Private?: U.S. Commercial
Fisheries, supra note 26, at 934 n.73 (saying open access fisheries has "two distinct roots" -
the public trust doctrine and Grotius' writings - but the latter is "irrelevant" to the debates
over limited entry because of its "high seas focus and reliance on notions of the
inexhaustibility of ocean resources").
165. Although there are subtle differences between a commons and common pool
resources, the terms are used interchangeably in this Article. See Alison Rieser, supra note
18, at 400 (distinguishing between a common pool resource, which describes "the nature
and condition of the resource," and common property, which is descriptive of one type of
"management regime").
166. With the exception of leasing space on the outer continental shelf for the
extraction of oil, natural gas, and other mineral resources, these waters have not been
withdrawn from public access and the United States has never relinquished its sovereignty
over the waters or resources of the EEZ. See Rieser, supra note 19, at 820 (saying the
"public right of fishing" under United States law "tends to maintain [a] condition of non-
exclusivity" and "to justify maintaining a condition of open access"); McCay, supra note 1,
at 196-202 (describing how United States fishers rejected "Old World laws of inland
fisheries" which were based on "the privileges of private property," avowing instead "the
sentiment . . . of 'free-taking"'); David A. Dana, Overcoming the Political Tragedy of the
Commons: Lessons Learmed from the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q 833,
846 (1997) (describing ocean fisheries as "one of the most important remaining commons
in the American economy").
167. See OSTROM, supra note 26, at 133-46, 136 (distinguishing between water rights
held by water producers, which are "separable from land and well-defined," and the basins
that are the source of these rights, which are not owned or "centrally regulated," and "are
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the right of access to fishing grounds, the right to capture fish and
"enjoy the yield" of their efforts, the right to manage the fishery
until that right is preempted by the government, the right to
exclude others, and the right to give away any of these rights, they
do not hold these rights exclusivelyw-i.e. they hold the right to take
fish "in common with all other fishermen.'
' 68
The fact that oceans are a commons and the resources in them
are available for the taking has contributed to the decline in fish
stocks.'69 The result of this decline may be that what has been the
last truly "open frontier" may finally be closing. 7 °
managed by a polycentric set of limited-purpose governmental enterprises").
168. See Rieser, supra note 19, at 819 (describing four "principle regimes" of
common property: open access, and government, private, or communal ownership, and
saying that of the "sticks" or rights that fishers may get under each of these regimes, the
right to manage is the broadest as it includes "the authority" to take engage in activities
"affecting the resource's condition"). See also id. at 820 (saying that fishers "do not own any
of these rights exclusively," at most, they have a use right, consisting of the right of access
and the right to take fish, while the government maintains the right to manage the
resource, including the right to exclude and alienate).
169. See Rieser, supra note 18, at 400-01 ("The physical nature of common-pool
resources [like fisheries] tends to encourage their overconsumption" because of "the
difficulty of excluding other potential users" from the resource as fish stock may be
seasonally migratory and located at a significant distance from land, and because once fish
are "captured" they are not "available to other fishers, predators, or to the stock itself for
reproduction"); id. at 401 (identifying the ocean's biological diversity as a CPR
"benefit[ing] the entire biosphere," and saying that when that benefit "is reduced by
activities such as overfishing or habitat destruction, the value to all current and future
beneficiaries is diminished"). See also Colin W. Clark, Restricted Access to Common Property
Fishery Resources: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, in DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION AND MATHEMATICAL
ECON. 117 (E. P.T. Liu ed., 1980) (saying "the 'tragedy of the commons' has proved
particularly difficult to counteract in the case of marine fisheries resources where the
establishment of individual property rights is virtually out of the question"), quoted in
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 26, at 13; id ("common ownership is the
fundamental fact affecting almost every regime of fishery management"); H. Scott
Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Research: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124
(1954) ("The fish in the sea are valueless to the fisherman, because there is no assurance
that they will be there for him tomorrow if they are left behind today.") quoted in OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 26, at 3. But see Seth Macinko and Daniel W. Bromley,
Property and Fisheries for the Twenty-First Century: Seeking Coherence From Legal and
Economic Doctrine, 28 VT. L. REv. 623, 645-51, 645 (2004) critiquing the "standard
diagnosis" for the so-called "fishery problem" as being a "property rights problem");
McCay & Acheson, Human Ecology of the Commons, in The QUESTION OF THE COMMONS,
supra note 1, at 28-29(citing sources for the proposition that open access is "only one of a
larger set of causes of those tragedies" of the commons).
170. See Susan Hanna, The New Frontier of American Fisheries Government, 20
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 221, 223 (1997) (describing ocean fisheries as an "ocean-resource
based frontier") cited by Rieser, supra note 18, at 418. Rieser says "the increasing number of
spillover effects between users, including fisheries bycatch levels, habitat destruction, and
changes in biological relations among trophic levels (such as predator-prey relations)" are
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The institutions of the frontier, including open access, creation
of ownership at the point of capture, and reliance on the
resource user to make decisions about resource use in
competition with others (a scramble competition strategy) are no
longer appropriate."'
One response to this closing frontier has been to look toward
private property solutions to open access problems, such as
individual fish quotas ("IFQs").172
Aquaculture sidesteps entirely the debate over the cause of the
collapse of wild fish stocks and whether to stop the downward
spiral through marketplace mechanisms like IFQs or governmental
another "signal" that the ocean resource frontier is closing. Rieser, supra note 18, at 418.
But see Macinko & Bromley, supra note 168, at 645-46 (seeing commercialization of the
oceans as "a "new homestead movement" and the "oceans as the last American frontier
freely available for expropriation").
171. Rieser, supra note 18, at 418. Much has been written about what fisheries
management regime should replace the existing largely uncontrolled one. See, e.g., Rieser,
supra note 19, at 826-29 (proposing a "contractual, co-management" model, in which the,
government "cedes rights and responsibilities" in a certain fishery for a set period to a
"local fishery management agency," like a community association, where the rights would
be "renewable semi-permanent rights" and include the right to "define conditions of
access, and prescribe management controls" ). But see generally OSTROM, supra note 26
(saying ecological and sociological complexity requires as a response institutional
complexity, and rejecting the concept of one size fits all, meaning that common pool
resources must either be regulated or privately owned); Thompson, supra note 8, at 243,
246 (exploring why "it has proven difficult for governments, communities, and other
institutions to adopt and implement solutions to common dilemmas - and even more
troubling, why resource users often have been the most vociferous opponents of
solutions," and seeking ways that they could be "enlist[ed] ... in solving the tragic cycle in
which they are trapped").
172. The Magnuson-Stevens Act authorizes IFQs. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b) (Westlaw
2006). Wyman describes IFQs as a "property rights-based approach for managing
resources" because they "share the same purpose," improving economic efficiency, "as
other more familiar forms of private property," and because they share "many of the
formal characteristics commonly assumed to inhere in private property," i.e. they are
"individual allotments that are exclusive, durable, and alienable," "even though there is
considerable reluctance to characterize them as such for fear of attracting takings liability"
in the event that the government reduces their value. Wyman, supra note 3, at 163-64. See
16 U.S.C. § 1853(d) (2) (A) (Westlaw 2006) (providing IFQs can be revoked or limited
without compensation) & § 1853(d) (3) (Westlaw 2006) (declaring IFQs to be permits
which can be revoked or limited, and which create no compensable right). See also Am.
Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding fishery
permittees "did not and could not" possess a property interest); accord Conti v. United
States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding no property interest in a
swordfishing permit because fisher "could not assign, sell, or transfer" it as "it did not
confer exclusive fishing privileges, and because the government at all times retained the
right to revoke, suspend, or modify it").
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regulation of fishing.7 1 Instead, it focuses on replacing those
depleted stocks with farmed fish. But, ocean fish ranching, by
proposing to enclose portions of the EEZ for the commercial
cultivation of fish, is just another type of privatization of a common
pool resource.7 4 Although enclosing parts of the ocean is quite
different than giving fishers a transferable, exclusive right to take a
certain quantity of fish,1 75 each involves the conversion of a
common pool resource to individual private property.
7 6
B. Looking Through the Individual Fish Quotas Lens at Enclosing the
Oceans
"[M]any of the liveliest contemporary debates concerning
property rights are about whether to create private rights in
resources traditionally owned by the public through the state, such
173. But see OSTROM, supra note 26, at 14 (saying institutional solutions to common
pool resource problems are "rarely either private or public - 'the market' or 'the state"').
See also Ralph Townsend & James A. Wilson, An Economic View of the Tragedy of the Commons,
in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 1, at 318, 319 (critiquing IFQs, and saying
it is difficult to "create private-property rights" in mobile species, and that "imitating
private-property rights without exclusive property rights creates neither the incentives for
socially appropriate behavior nor a spontaneous enforcement mechanism").
174. Efforts to privatize portions of the ocean by enclosing them have not succeeded
to date, not for lack of trying. See Wyman, supra note 3, at 126 ("for over six decades" there
has been a largely unsuccessful international effort to enclose the oceans: the first "wave"
occurred after the end of World War II when "countries began claiming national property
rights over ever-larger expanses of the oceans" and their marine resources; the second
when individual countries "subdivided national property rights in fisheries domestically
into smaller-scale communal regimes;" and for the last thirty years, through the "creation
of individual tradable rights"). For an extreme proposal to privatize the oceans see
Whitehead, Jr. et al, supra note 34, at 336 (arguing that privatizing the ocean would allow
owners to farm fish in their sections, 'Just as landowners breed and raise cattle on private
land"); id. at 341-43 (proposing "electronic fences" to divide open water up between
different property owners and to allow for fish "breeders ... to herd their charges" just
like barbed wire allows for herding cattle "in above-ground pastures," and computer chips
on boats to track the amount of time fish spend in various property sections).
175. Indeed, some see IFQs as 'Just temporary waypoints on the path to privatization
of 'what really counts,' the marine ecosystem itself." Macinko & Bromley, supra note 168, at
624; see also id. at 652, quoting RIGHTS BASED FISHING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATO
ADVANCED RESEARCH WORKSHOP ON SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATIONS FOR RIGHTS BASED FISHING
3 (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1989) ("ITQs are part of one of the great institutional
changes of our times: the enclosure and privatization of the common resources of the
ocean").
176. See Buzbee, Regulatory Commons, supra note 6, at 8 (describing aquaculture as "an
industry where harvesters of ocean, river, or lake resources work not in such waters subject
to shared use rights, but in confined pens subject to their own maintenance obligations,
harvesting rights, and rights to exclude others,.., in essence, an effort to privatize the
classic common pool resources of fisheries").
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as air, water, fisheries and public lands." '177 To Macinko and
Bromley, "the essential challenge, and the unavoidable imperative
in American fisheries policy, seems to be one of getting on with
the inevitable conversion of the oceans and their wealth to the
logic of thoroughgoing possessive individualism-Lockean private
property.
178
An IFQ is a form of "Lockean private property" to the extent
that it gives fishers an exclusive, transferable property interest in a
percentage of the allowable catch of a fish species over a given
time period (e.g. "limited access fishing licenses or individual
harvesting rights").
The idea behind an IFQ is that fishermen will avoid Hardin's
tragedy of the commons because they have been guaranteed their
share of the allowable harvest whenever they go fishing and thus
will not need to "invest in excessive fishing power or deploy an
excess of fishing gear in order to win the 'race to the fish.""8 In
the absence of IFQs, Terry Anderson and other free market
environmentalists argue that government regulation, usually
consisting of limitations on fishing gear, boat size, and the size of
the fish catch, "introduce[s] inefficiency into the fishing fleet,"
perversely prompting the industry to invest in ways to catch more
177. Wyman, supra note 3, at 125; see also Macinko & Bromley, supra note 168, at 635-
38 (discussing. how Justice Field's dissent in Geer emphasizing the "law of capture" has
influenced contemporary property rights-based rhetoric in fisheries policy).
178. Macinko & Bromley, supra note 168, at 651-52.
179. Rieser, Contracting for the Commons, supra note 19, at 821; see also Wyman, supra
note 3, at 163 n.118. According to Wyman, only six federal fisheries in U.S. coastal waters
have IFQ programs; another five have IFQ-type programs. Id. at 167. IFQs are different
from "license limitation" where the total number of participants in a given fishery is
"fixed," but each fisher's "share of the total allowable catch (TAC) is not fixed... [so that]
[e]ach licensed participant competes directly against all other licensees for a portion of
the TAC"; under an IFQ system, "the total pool of participants is not fixed, but each
participant's share of the TAC is fixed by the amount of shares possessed," which amount
"is adjusted by buying and selling shares in an open market." Macinko, supra note 26, at
923 (likening license limitations to "taxicab medallions" and IFQs to "stock market shares"
or "tradable emissions"). Both TACs and IFQs limit entry into the fishery. Id.
180. Rieser, supra note 18, at 407. But Rieser goes on to say that IFQs have not
prevented over-fishing because, after foreign fishing vessels were removed from the U.S.
EEZ, the domestic fishing industry grew to "unprecedented levels," which "led to .. .
overcapacity, reduced profits, short and dangerous fishing seasons, and continuous
political pressure on the management system to relax conservation and management
measures." Id. at 408-09. The 1996 SFA was passed to counteract this trend by
reintroducing measures to prevent over-fishing and encourage conservation of fish stocks,
as well as to give "attention to non-commercial marine resources and the habitat impacts
of fishing gear and activities." Id. at 409.
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fish. '8 This effort reduces fish stocks even more and increases
overcapitalization of the fleet, which, in turn, dissipates resource
rents8 2 from the fishery as they are "wasted in the endless struggle
to evade regulation and to catch fish before the fishery is closed.' ' 83
Indeed, free market environmentalists tout IFQs as a solution to
the "relentless and futile cycle in fisheries regulation,"'' 4 because
only giving fishermen "a private right to harvest an amount of fish
which they can use or sell" will enable them to "break out of the
cycle" that is the tragedy of the commons.8 5
While IFQs have many critics, most of the criticisms leveled
against them concern implementation,"18 a subject which is beyond
181. Rieser, supra note 18, at 399.
182. On the concept of economic rent in the fishing industry, see Marvin, supra note
30, at 1145 n.146 (defining economic rent as a fisher's income beyond that required to
keep him from abandoning fishing, and stating that "[iun a perfectly competitive market
all fishermen are paid the price necessary to keep the last fisherman fishing," and that "the
industry's economic rent" is the income fishers "collectively receive over and above the
lowest price they would individually accept").
183. Rieser,, supra note 18, at 399; Marvin, supra note 30, at 114548 (discussing these
phenomena). But see Rose, supra note, 161 at 70 (describing the use of common property
regimes by holders of IFQs to conserve fishing habitat); cf Erin Webreck, The Challenge of
Battling Privatization: A Case Study of Swedish Water Companies, 5 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL'Y, Winter.2005, at 30. (listing arguments in favor of privatizing water systems such as
that private interests possess sufficient financial resources to maintain natural resources
and have the technical expertise and "aptitude" to manage resources efficiently).
184. Rieser, supra note 18, at 398-99, citing TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL,
FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 121-34 (1991); see also Rieser, supra note 19, at 823
(stating that IFQs can "reduce costs by eliminating the race to fish and by allowing the
market to allocate fishing rights to lower cost fishermen and fishing methods," freeing up
"money to invest in resource improvement," and "reducing overcrowding [of fishing
grounds], the race to harvest in an increasingly shorter season, landing gluts, and poor
quality").
185. Rieser, supra note 18, at 399. However, the holder of an IFQ does not have a
property right in the fish she is entitled to take, as the government can revoke or curtail an
IFQ at any time without compensation, and it does not create a right in, or title to, fish
before they are harvested. Rieser, supra note 19, at 821, citing Sustainable Fisheries Act,
Pub. L. 104-297, § 108(e), 110 Stat. 3559, 3576-77 (1996) (codified at 16 § U.S.C. 1853(d)
(Westlaw 2006)). Macinko & Bromley, supra note 168, at 625 (saying that they "know of no
explanation of IFQs that does not invoke a property rights-based explanation of how IFQs
work"). Indeed, the limited nature of this right, reflected in the fact that the government
can "expropriate the resource or fail to renew the use rights," prompts Rieser and others
to criticize IFQs on the ground that the holder of those rights will not have "sufficient
certainty or incentive to invest in the long-term value of the resource." Rieser, supra note
19, at 822 (explaining how the language of the Magnuson-Stevens Act "disavowing any
duty to compensate IFQ holders... works against the creation of stewardship incentives"
and regulations implementing the Act that restrict the transfer of IFQs to protect "the
social structure of existing fishing communities" decreases the incentives of IFQ holders
.to consider how others value the right, including future generations").
186. See generally Rieser, supra note 19, at 822-23 (complaining that the enforcement
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the scope of this article. However, some criticisms focus on the
idea of privatizing portions of the oceans."7 This article focuses on
those concerns because they are also germane to the privatization
involved in ocean fish ranching.
Critics protest that individual property approaches like IFQs
ignore communal rights in common pool resources and
communal norms, which have a socializing influence.' They
contend that IFQs often create social and economic inequities
because of the greater political and economic clout of the fishing
industry to influence the distribution of licenses.8 9 This favoring of
large fishing firms over smaller, less economically powerful fishers,
which might also be expected to occur in the case of large ocean
fish ranching enterprises, rewards efficiency over equity. 9 °
costs of IFQs are high because they reward cheating, and that IFQs are distributed to too
many holders because they are instituted late in the management process in mature
fisheries, are set too high, encourage rent-seeking, and are too inflexible to allow the
adoption of alternative management strategies); Rieser, supra note 18, at 405-06 (saying
that IFQs ignore community stakeholders who "are more likely to embody a broader range
of values and . . . therefore balance harvesting decisions against broader spatial and
temporal views of the ecosystem" and who are able to "enforce limits on individual
appropriators through informal norms and sanctions"; Wyman, supra note 3, at 160 n.110
(saying IFQs encourage fishers to "highgrade" (to catch more economically valuable fish)
or not report their actual catches, "are inconsistent with ecosystem-based management...
[because] they are premised on single species management," and may "give rise to
expectations among fishers" that they are a form of property right); Rose, supra note 7, at
22 (indicating property rights systems are expensive to monitor and enforce).
187. See, e.g. McCay, supra note 1, at 208-09 (describing resistance of local oystermen
to enclosing the commons through creation of private or leased oyster beds and
"persistence of the sentiment or culture of the commons"); Rieser, supra note 19, at 814
(asserting that if there are to be "property regime[s]" as part of management strategies to
conserve fish stocks, then those regimes must "reflect both the public property rights in
the ecological condition of the marine environment and the private or common
ownership rights of access, harvesting and management").
188. See Robert W. Gordon, Paradoxical Property, in EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF
PROPERTY 95, 108 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995) (saying that property
ownership has suppressed "the collective and collaborative elements" of society arising
from "the necessity of mutual dependence"); Rieser, supra note 18, at 419 (saying that any
new property rights "must be created in a manner informed by a wider sense of social
justice" and must establish "a link.., between rights and responsibilities").
189. Neal D. Black, Note, Balancing the Advantages of Individual Transferable Quotas
Against Their Redistributive Effects: The Case of Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 9 GEO. INT'L
ENVTrL. L. REV. 727, 728 (1997) (saying that IFQs "tend to favor larger, more efficient
fishing operations").
190. See Wyman, supra note 3, at 160 (saying ITQs, by "privileging aggregate
efficiency over equity," will cause small fishers to lose access to rents and consolidate
harvesting in a few large, more efficient firms); DeLuca, supra note 14, at 757 (noting that
the "bias [in this country] towards capital over labor . .. [is] reflected in the IFQ
programs" and conflicts with "other values, such as prior effort, community development
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Through time this process ensures that quota becomes
concentrated in the possession of fewer and fewer vessel owners.
It also assures that through time fewer coast communities contain
vessels with quota supplying resource to local plants. In short,
quota and fishing activity become increasinly concentrated in
fewer and fewer enterprises and fishing towns.'
Additionally, some critics assert that individual property rights
like IFQs are fundamentally at odds with the nature of ecosystems,
which are complex, dynamic, self-organizing systems. 9 ' Alison
Rieser says that human intrusion into those complex systems
through various management prescriptions must, "over the long
term," "sustain the integrity of an entire ecosystem," of which fish
stocks are only one element.1"3 Marine ecosystems "have valuable
components beyond the fish caught, marketed, and consumed,"
such as biodiversity and habitats.19 4 Granting individual property
and stability"); Macinko, supra note 26, at 924-25 (describing the "[d]istributional equity
concerns" arising in the design of any limited entry system and how the "prevailing"
United States design, which grants "transferable privileges .. in perpetuity free of charge
to qualifying vessel owners" creates "[t]he specter of high market values," which, in turn,
raises four other concerns: "the basic equity involved in the apparent give-away of a public
resource to a few individuals" who may experience "a sizable windfall"; "intergenerational
equity" to the extent high entry costs prevent entry of future generations; "consolidation of
the industry into the hands of large capital owners at the expense of small-scale
participants"; and "the combined impact of the above concerns on fisheries-dependent
coastal communities"); id. at 932, quoting Letter from T. Seaton to R. Berg, Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv. (undated) (saying that the Alaskan halibut and sablefish ITQ plan "locks
out women" and "locks in the white male 'good ole boys club' of vessel owners" because it
privileges prior participation in the industry when women did not participate); Ragnor
Arnason, Property Rights as a Means of Economic Organization, in Use of Property Rights in
Fisheries Management: Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, Vol. 1 at 24-25 (Ross
Shotton ed., 2000) available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP (search for "Use of Property
Rights in Fisheries Management"; follow hyperlink for volume 1; follow hyperlink for the
Arnason chapter) (saying instituting private property rights "almost by definition
dispossesses someone" and "means the exclusion of a subset of the population" as well as
"the expropriation of prior rights," and that the question as to whether the "dispossessed"
receive compensation for their loss "depends to a large extent on who has the political and
economic power in society"), quoted in Macinko & Bromley, supra note 168, at 654 n.147.
191. Anthony Davis, To Transfer or Not to Transfer, ATLANTIC FISHERMAN, at 5, (May
1993), quoted in Douglas F. Britton, Comment, The Privatization of the American Fishery:
Limitations, Recognitions, and the Public Trust, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 217, 247 n.162
(1997).. See Macinko, supra note 26, at 940 (saying that"[f]isheries use rights conflicts
pitted a 'culture of the commoners' against those who viewed them as obstacles to
progress").
192. Rieser, supra note 18, at 404 (describing ecosystems as complex, "resilient,
dynamic, and self-organizing").
193. Id. (identifying this as one of the "hallmarks of 'ecosystem management"'; the
other being the "adaptive and precautionary use of science to achieve that reality").
194. Id. Rieser also observes that "[ciatching a species of fish for sale realizes one
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rights in fish or their ocean habitat runs "a serious risk that all
other valuable components of the ecosystem, which have no direct
market value and whose contribution to the ecosystem's
productivity is not understood, will be ignored." '95 To Rieser,
"property rights accorded any one individual cannot adequately
take account of the entire ecosystem," and the concept of an
individual property right should be seen as being "more consistent
with the previous era of resource use, a time when the policy goal
was to design incentives to capture the flow of benefits from fish
populations without an excess investment in physical capital."
1 96
Professor Carol Rose fears that a property-based measure will
"elevate the significance of the propertized component and, in
effect, over-value them," which will encourage the property rights
holder to disregard the "entitlements of others interested in the
same resource or ecosystem."'97 This, in turn, might lead the
stronger entitlement holders to over-reach and "overstate what
they 'own"', blocking management initiatives designed to protect
"other components of the same ecosystem."'9 8 Further, giving
ocean fish ranchers an exclusive right to use the ocean for the
cultivation of fish creates a quasi- property right in those fish and
their habitat which "by definition, excludes some individuals from
participation."" The underdog in these situations may well be
value of a rich and diverse marine ecosystem." Id. at 405. See also Paul Greenberg, The
Catch, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, §6, at 60 (describing the plight of the Chilean sea bass as
illustrating why "the world is running out of fish" and describing the "cascading decline of
fish species").
195. Rieser, supra note 18, at 405. But see Lee P. Breckinridge, Can Fish Own Water?:
Envisioning Nonhuman Property in Ecosystems, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 293, 297 (2004)
(suggesting that "the ecological design of property regimes may involve 'seeing' property
in new places .... [and] recognizing nonhuman entities as property holders").
196. Rieser, supra note 18, at 418-19.
197. Id. at 405, citing Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and
Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 173 (1998).
198. Rieser, supra note 18, at 405, citing Rose, supra note 196, at 173. Rieser's solution
to this problem is that any property rights in fish, like IFQs, should "emphasize less the
individual nature of the property right and more the community nature of the right." Id,
This can be done for fisheries by giving communities ITQs. Rieser, supra note 18, at 405.
Rieser warns that any system of co-management must include "the right to exclude others
from . . . the fishery." Rieser, supra note 19 at 826; see also Britton, supra note 190, at 255
(arguing for "community-based fishery management systems," which "seek to harness the
forces of custom and culture to constrain the tragedy of the commons by allowing
fishermen to participate in the government regulation of fisheries").
199. Gorina-Ysern, supra note 9, at 704, quoting Phillip E. Steinberg, Fish or Foul:
Investigating the Politics of the Marine Stewardship Council, CONFERENCE ON MARINE ENVrL.




Rieser worries that individual property rights cannot respond
to the "cascading effects" on the entire marine environment
caused by the collapse of fish stocks.2"' Quoting Professor Lee
Breckenridge, she notes that individual property rights are based
on a view of nature "as something that can be 'separated into
components and dedicated to [the] production of particular
commodities' "-in the case of ocean fish ranching operations,
these components are the discrete parts of the ocean ecosystem.
However, this view ignores all the other "legitimate claims of other
components of marine ecosystems." ' 3
When the marine environment is viewed "ecologically," Rieser
says, it is "at work, performing important services in its unaltered
state . . . . Transformation diminishes the functioning of this
economy and, in fact, is at odds with it."20 4 This suggests that use
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/macarthur/marine/papers/steinberg-6.html. Although
Steinberg's comment is directed toward the Marine Stewardship Council's certification
program that would privately "certify" local fishing fleets that adhere to a "fisheries code of
conduct" and fish processors and distributors who buy from them, the idea that property
can be created in fish through a market mechanism that results in the exclusion of some
fishers from taking part in a "club" of exclusive participants, is analogous to giving ocean
ranchers an exclusive right to take what in essence is a "club good." For a fuller description
of how this Council would work, see id. at 704, n. 233.
200. Cf Webreck, supra note 182,. at 30 (saying that privatizing water supplies may
leave poorer areas "suffering because long-term investment in resources" may become
"infeasible and unprofitable" and cause a price increase in "essential resources," which can
lead to "increased social conflict," invite corruption, and be "fundamentally unfair and
unjust" to the extent that the "poorest members of society" must pay for essential resources
instead of having them provided based on need). The SFA contains provisions "requiring
consideration of the importance of fishing to certain 'fishing communities' and greater
attention to the distribution of economic benefits from U.S. fisheries." Rieser, supra note
18, at 409, citing 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8) (Westlaw 2006); see also Christie, Living Marine
Resources Management, supra note 12, at 159 (saying that the 1990 Magnuson-Stevens Act
amendments require regional fisheries management plans include a "fishery impact
statement" to "assess, specify, and describe" the plan's effects on fishing communities and
that National Standard 8, added to the law in 1996, directs regional managers to consider
the importance of fish to fishing communities and "to the extent practicable" minimize
adverse economic impacts on those communities and sustain their participation in the
fishery), quotingl6 U.S.C. §§ 1851 (a) (8), 1853(a)(9) (Wesdlaw 2006).
201. Rieser, supra note 18, at 419.
202. Id., quoting Lee P. Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape: The Institutional
Challenges of Ecosystem Management for Lands in Private Ownership, 19 VT. L. REV. 363, 385
(1995).
203. Rieser, supra note 18, at 419.
204. Rieser, supra note 18, at 420, quoting Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the
Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1433, 1442 (1993).
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rights should arise principally from nature-based considerations.
"The marine environment is, like land, part of a community which
extends beyond the dominion of the owner, where use rights must
be determined by physical nature, not humankind, and where
public and exclusive owners have a custodial and affirmative
protective role for ecological functions. '115 As IFQs are a "highly
individualistic mode of production," what Anthony Scott terms the
"hunting-and-gathering stage of economic production," Rieser also
worries that IFQs will discourage participants "from collecting and
sharing information; conserving, protecting, and enhancing fish
stocks; and achieving economies of scale."2 6 This happens because
fishing under an IFQ system "still leave Is] each fishery in the
hunting and gathering stage of economic production.., a highly
individualistic mode of production" that creates disincentives for
"collectively advancing the 'new concern for the future value of
their property' that they share."20v In any new technology, such as
ocean fish ranching, the collection and sharing of information,
especially about problems with that technology, is critical.
Privatizing portions of the ocean through a property-based
mechanism such as the IFQ will commodify a common pool
resource and give ocean fish ranchers the most important stick in
the bundle of property rights:0. the ability to exclude the public
from what otherwise would be publicly available resources.2" This
205. Rieser, supra note 18, at 420; see also Breckinridge, supra note 194, at 303
("[H]uman institutions must become newly flexible, adaptive, and open to environmental
signals.... [T]he main goal must be to foster resilience in ecosystems and avoid human-
induced alterations beyond the range of perturbations that ecosystems have evolved to
absorb.").
206. Rieser, supra note 19 at 824, quoting Anthony D. Scott, The /TQ as a Property
Right: Where It Came From, How It Works, and Where It is Going, in TAKING OWNERSHIP:
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FISHERY MANAGEMENT ON THE ATLANTIC COAST 31, 79-80 (Brian
Lee Crowley ed., 1996). But see Rieser, supra note 19, at 826 (saying that public choice
scholarship shows that a top down regulatory approach "is vulnerable to the pressures of
special interest groups . . . and to the self-interest of governmental officials and
politicians," and that "when government agencies regulate fisheries, fishermen often
selectively provide managers with information about the resource and the technology they
use").
207. Rieser, supra note 19, at 824.
208. See Rieser, supra note 19, at 819 (saying that "[piroperty law has given us the
metaphor of property as a bundle of rights composed of several 'sticks,' each stick
consisting of a distinct right or power that ownership conveys," and "applied the ...
metaphor to fishing"); see also id. at 827 (saying in fisheries the right to exclude is
"essential".
209. Macinko views Arnold v. Mundy as "a pronouncement on the duty of the state, as
the representative of the people, to maintain common use fights as an instrument of
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conversion contradicts the proposition that common pool natural
resources should be open to all and not subject to individual
appropriation.
[T] he purported inefficiencies of shellfishing and other activities
done within a common-property regime must be assessed against
the fact that "it was with a particular social welfare function in
mind that our founders determined that certain natural
resources would remain the common property of all-not the
private property of the fortunate few.
2 10
Critics of IFQs have shown how converting common pool
resources into individual property can create distributional
inequities, undermine communal norms, and contradict the
natural workings of ecosystems. Moreover, they have detailed how
private property regimes can impede the sharing of information
and implementation of broader management strategies. They have
also shown how conversion to a private property-based regime can
lead to resource management problems without necessarily
promoting conservation of resources or economic advancement of
local fishing communities.1
If IFQs are an imperfect answer to declining fish populations,
then should not ocean fish ranching, with its potential to offset
those losses, be welcomed and even encouraged? Yet this article
distributional equity." Macinko, supra note 26, at 937 ("For the state, in its regulatory
capacity, to divest the citizens of their common rights 'would be a grievance which never
could be long borne by a free people."'), quoting Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (1821).
210. McCay, supra note 1, at 209, quoting D.W. Bromley, Land and Water Problems in
an Institutional Perspective, 64 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 834, 842 (1982); see also Victor B. Flatt,
This Land is Your Land (Our Right to the Environment), 107 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 24 (2004)
(saying environmental rights "are like property to the extent that we need or want natural
resources such as fish stocks... or like torts to the extent they protect human autonomy
through protection of human health"); MichaelJ. Sandel, What Money Can't Buy: The Moral
Limits of Markets, in THE TANNER LECURES ON HUMAN VALUES, VOL. 21, 87, 94-95 (Grethe
B. Peterson ed., 2000) (saying that extending the reach of markets creates opportunities
for people to be "coerced" into "buy[ing] and sell[ing] things under conditions of severe
inequality or dire economic necessity" and that subjecting some "moral or civic goods" or
practices to "market valuation and exchange" will "diminish[] or corrupt[]" them, which
cannot be cured "by fixing the background conditions within which market exchanges
take place," since this argument "appeals ... to the moral importance of the goods at
stake").
211. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Limited Prospects for Privatization of Public Lands:
Presidio and Valles Caldera May Be as Good as It Gets, 44 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 475, 479 (2004)
(noting that if preservation of natural resources is "our objective," then pursuing a
"model" that emphasizes "efficient resource allocation" is "risky"); id. at 481 (referring to
the "narrow prospects" for preservation that privatization of public lands holds).
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has shown that there are serious concerns with allowing ocean fish
ranching to proceed unregulated, some of which may flow from
the replacement of a common property management regime with
a private property one.
The article turns next to an exploration of the public trust
doctrine as a possible regulatory gap filler, a means of preventing
these harms until a comprehensive, protective regulatory program
can be implemented. However, before the public trust doctrine
can be so employed, a basis for its application must be found.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE EEZ
[N] othing is clearer settled in the law than that all men have the
right to catch fish in the bays, inlets, and arms of the sea, and that
no man has the right to catch fish to the injury of others in their
rights.
2 12
The public trust doctrine is a venerable common law property
doctrine rooted in Roman law23 and long recognized in the
United States. The doctrine is based on the proposition that the
sovereign holds certain common properties in trust in perpetuity
for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. Public
access to public trust resources is at the core of the doctrine.214
212. McCay, supra note 1, at 206, quoting S.F. Baird, Report on the Condition of the Sea
Fisheries of the South Coast of New England in 1871 and 1872, in REPORT OF THE U.S.
COMMISSION OF FISH AND FISHERIES FOR 1871, at 91 (1873).
213. For a succinct summary of the origins of the public trust doctrine and its
passage through time, see generally Dowie, supra note 82, at 1. See also Gary D. Meyers,
Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19
ENvrL. L. 723, 734 (1989) (calling the public trust doctrine a "transcendent legal
principle" with "roots ... in natural law"); Ralph W. Johnson & William C. Galloway,
Protection of Biodiversity Under the Public Trust Doctrine, 8 TUL. ENVFL. L.J. 21, 29 (1994)
(saying the public trust doctrine "binds state agencies as well as private parties" because it
is "a rule of property law" once adopted by state courts). On the transnational impact of
the American public trust doctrine, see Jona Razzaque, Case Law Analysis, Application of
Public Trust Doctrine in Indian Environmental Cases, 13 J. Envtl. L. 221 (2001) (U.K.)
(analyzing the Indian Supreme Court's application of the public trust doctrine to protect
India's natural resources and parks, and the Court's reliance on Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892), Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410 (1966), Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983), and Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 469 (1988)- to reach its decision).
214. See Meyers, supra note. 213, at 731 ("In essence, the courts protect access rights
to public trust resources."). Cf Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671
P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983) (allowing the construction of exclusive yacht club on a lake, but
only after finding the club would not interfere with navigation if properly lighted and
marked and did not substantially impair public rights in the remaining waters and that the
grant remained subject to the public trust).
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Consequently, "absolute private dominion over property impressed
with the public trust can never be granted unless it is in the public
interest to do so,"25 since it interferes with public access to those
resources.
ProfessorJoseph Sax rediscovered the public trust doctrine in a
1970 article,26 in which he suggested it be used to address a variety
of environmental harms. Since then, others have deployed the
doctrine to protect natural resources from commercial
development and to assure public access to those resources "for
the exercise of historically recognized rights, 2 17 like fishing,
oystering, and navigation."' Although expanded over time to
215. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 433 (1892); see also United States v.
1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 122-23 (D. Mass. 1981) ("Historically, no developed
western civilization has recognized absolute rights of private ownership in [submerged]
land as a means of allocating this scarce and precious resource among the competing
public demands. Though private ownership was permitted in the Dark Ages, neither
Roman law nor the English common law as it developed after the signing of the Magna
Charta would permit it.").
216. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). Professor Blumm notes courts have cited
Professor Sax's article thirty three times as of 1989. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie,
Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29
HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 321, 342 n.125 (2005).
217. Fernandez, Public Trust, Riparian Rights, and Aquaculture, supra note 216, at 302
n. 49; see also Harry R. Bader, Antaeus and the Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to
Substantive Environmental Protection in the Common Law, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 749, 761
(1992) ( "The marriage of absolute ecological protection with absolute access for the
purpose of utilizing natural resources comes the closest to the true essence of the public
trust doctrine."); Meyers, Protection of Wildlife, supra note 212, at 735 ( "[T]he public's
interest in common natural resources .... includes both access to those resources for
economic and nonconsumptive uses as well as restrictions on use or access to promote
common needs and amenities."); Macinko, Public or Private?: U.S. Commercial Fisheries, supra
note 26, at 954 ("A striking feature of the idea of the classic [public] trust doctrine, the
role of common use rights in mediating class relations through distributional equity, is
that it underlies responses to great class challenges of different epochs."); id. at 920
(faulting the "abandon[ment]" of the doctrine's original emphasis on "distributional
equity and common rights based upon democratic ideals" in "our contemporary quest for
environmental preservation" and of its original "specificity . . . in exchange for the
extreme malleability of current articulations").
218. See generally, Hope M. Babcock, Has the United States Supreme Court Finally Drained
the Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence? The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on
Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 1, 36-54 (1995) (discussing the
doctrine's evolution in this country); Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council Protect Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-o-Links, and Other Things
that Go Bump in the Night, 85 IowA L. REV. 849, 889-98 (summarizing salient aspects of the
public trust doctrine and its application to many species of wildlife, including fish); Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (saying state title to lands under
navigable waters are "held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein
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protect an array of land-based resources and a variety of uses,
including recreation, the doctrine's origins were water-based, and
it was traditionally applied to protect public rights in fishing,
oystering, and navigation. 9
The ocean has the attributes of a classic public trust resource-
res communis, 22 "open to everyone, belonging to everyone, and
incapable of appropriation by anyone. 221 Indeed, "[t]he sea is
common to all because it is so limitless that it cannot become a
possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all,
whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of
fisheries.,222
The public trust doctrine protects public rights in trust
resources and prevents the government or private individuals from
alienating or otherwise adversely affecting those rights. 223 This
freed from the obstruction of private parties," and thus different from state title in other
lands); cf California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 211
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (applying public trust doctrine to wildlife dependent on navigable
waters and their tributaries, and saying "[w]ild fish have always been recognized as a
species of property the general right and ownership of which is in the people of the
state").
219. See Babcock, Protecting Where the Wild Things Are, supra note 217, at 891 n.180 and
accompanying text; see also Emily A. Gardner, A Victim of Its Own Success: Can User Fees Be
Used to Save Hanauma Bay, 4 OcEAN & COASTAL LJ. 81, 98-99 (1999) ("While the public's
rights to use navigable waters were historically limited to uses associated with navigation,
commerce and fishing, since the United States' adoption of the public trust doctrine, a
number of state courts have expanded the list of protected rights in navigable waters to
include recreational uses."); Wood, Protecting the Wildlife Trust, infra note 222, at 611
(explaining the expansion of the doctrine's geographic coverage and scope of protected
trust-based activities).
220. Gorina-Ysern also argues as a basis for establishing a "world ocean public trust"
to protect ocean resources that the sea can be seen as res publicae, in which "the people of
the whole world (as a unity) have a collective property right." Gorina-Ysern, World Ocean
Public Trust, supra note 9, at 665-66.
221. Id. at 664; see also id. at 666 n.76 (explaining that "[u]nder common law, the jus
piscandi in the sea and in rivers belonged to all with very few exceptions," such as "fishing
in private rivers,... where it was customary not to fish for private gain but for the public
good, and where immemorial custom prohibited fishing").
222. HuGo GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM 28 n.3 (1608), quoted by Gorina-Ysern, World
Ocean Public Trust, supra note 9, at 661.
223. Babcock, Protecting Where the Wild things Are, supra note 217, at 891; see also Mary
Christina Wood, Protecting the Wildlife Trust: A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act, 34 ENVITL. L. 605, 612 (2004) (" [G] overnment trustees are required to preserve
wildlife assets and protect them against damage."); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. 1, 76-77
(1821) (saying the public trust doctrine protects public use rights in navigable waters, tidal
rivers, and the seacoast, "including both the water and the land under the water," for
purposes of "passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all the
other uses of the water and its products"); Vander Bloemen v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural
Res., No. 95-1761, 1996 WL 346266 (Wis. App. June 26, 1996) (unpublished decision)
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capacity to "constrain the natural tendency of governmental
officials to exhaust resources in the present generation" acts like "a
normative anchor . . . geared towards sustaining society for
generations to come." 24 Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to
hold that the doctrine imposes an affirmative obligation on states to
preserve trust resources for the benefit of the public.225
Uses of trust resources that are inconsistent with the doctrine
are revocable, and the government never loses its power to revoke
those uses. 226 Thus, the government has the equivalent of a
perpetual "easement" over trust resources that "permanently
burdens their ownership in favor of the general public."2 7
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which
(holding state properly exercised its fiduciary duties to protect lakeside ecosystem by
maintaining high water levels which it had created by raising lake's water level); Aspen
Wilderness Workshop v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1257 (Colo.
1995) (en banc) (holding state could not allow appropriation of water needed to preserve
natural environment for ski resort's snowmaking purposes). Some scholars have
recommended the expansion of the doctrine to protect entire ecosystems. See Eric.T.
Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1269, 1289-90 (1993) (arguing for
expanding the settings in which the legal concept of public trust could be applied); Alison
Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a
Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393 (1991)(explaining various theoretical bases for
expansion of the doctrine to protect naturally functioning ecosystems).
224. Wood, Protecting the Wildlife Trust, supra note 222, at 612; see also Commonwealth
v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 83 (1851) ("[W]hether this power be traced to the right of
property or right of sovereignty as its principle source, it must be regarded as held in trust
for the best interest of the public .... "); Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine, infra note
283, at 313 (suggesting courts should construe federal laws "to effectuate Congress' intent
to act as a trustee charged with the duty of protecting and preserving the public resources"
and to limit agency discretion).
225. Babcock, Protecting Where the Wild things Are, supra note 217, at 891 (saying this
application of the doctrine is "even more controversial than the doctrine itself"); see also
Deborah G. Musiker, Tom France & Lisa Hallenbeck, The Public Trust and Parens Patriae
Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L. REv. 87, 109 (1995)
(saying neither "the state's police power, state constitutions .... [nor] state and federal
legislation . . . render the public trust doctrine obsolete" or lessen its importance for
wildlife protection); NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v.Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336
A.2d 750, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 352 A.2d 337 (N.J.
1976) ("The State has not only the right, but also the affirmative fiduciary obligation to
ensure that the rights of the public to a viable marine environment are protected, and to
seek compensation for any diminution in that trust corpus."); Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe
Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978), affd in part and vacated in part, 628 F.2d 652
(lst Cir. 1980) (awarding Puerto Rican government $6 million for replacement of its
marine resources damaged by oil spill).
226. Babcock, Protecting Where the Wild Things Are, supra note 217, at 892.
227. Id. at 893 ("One cannot construct a common law canon more offensive to the
notion of absolute private rights in property than the public trust doctrine.").
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the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and the
soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and
control of private parties . . . than it can abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government and the preservation
228
of the peace.
This is not to say the public trust resources can never be
alienated. They can be conveyed to private hands if the alienation
will serve the public interest without harming trust uses in the
remaining land.229 In fact, there can be private title in trust
resources as long as the private use of trust resources is consistent
the trust's purposes, does not interfere with uses protected by that
doctrine, and will preserve those purposes for both present and
future generations.2 °
However, when courts are confronted with the conveyance of
trust resources for some private purpose, they react in different
ways. Some courts require only that the government agency
consider potential adverse impacts to the public trust in its review
of a proposed activity and allow the action to proceed if the
impacts on the remaining trust resources are minor.23' Other
courts apply a balancing approach when conflicts arise over the
228. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). See also id. at 452-53 (the public trust
doctrine does not "sanction the abdication of the general control of the State over lands
under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake").
229. Id. at 453 ("The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be
lost, except as to such- parcels as are used in promoting the interest of the public therein,
or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the
lands and waters remaining."); see also Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine
County (Mono Lake Case), 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983) ("The public trust is more than an
affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation
of the duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage[,]... surrendering that
right . . . only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the
purpose of the trust.") The public purpose that will be served by a conveyance of trust
lands cannot be "incidental, remote or secondary." Eichenberg &Vestal, Improving the Legal
Framework for Aquaculture, supra note 82, at 349.
230. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453; see also Britton, Privatization of the American Fishery,
supra note 190, at 249 (saying the doctrine could provide "a framework for recognizing
private property interests in fisheries resources, which could be recognized in the form of
a long-term lease interest in catch quotas," which could, in turn, "be allocated to
community or regional groups in a cooperative management system").
231. Musiker et al., supra note 224, at 98 (saying some courts allow action in
derogation of the public trust "to proceed only if the impacts are minimal or necessary");
see also Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 433, 453, 455 (imposing on states the duty to prevent
"substantial impairment" of trust resources); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d 709, 728-29
(1983) (saying the state can authorize the diversion of water to meet public needs, but
cannot do so "without consideration of the public trust" and must maintain "continuing
supervision of the taking" to be sure the public trust is not unnecessarily harmed).
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use of trust resources;2 2 while still others allow alienation of trust
resources upon legislative authorization. 2"3 Although courts vary in
the standards they use to evaluate the permissibility of transferring
trust resources to private holdings, all courts scrutinize the transfer
to see if the trust lands' "utility for public trust purposes" will be
diminished by private use. 211 Courts "look with considerable
skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated
either to reallocate [a public] resource to more restricted uses or to
subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties. 23 5
232. See, e.g., Nat'l. Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 728 ("This is not a case in which the
Legislature, the Water Board, or any judicial body has determined that the needs of Los
Angeles outweigh the needs of the Mono Basin, that the benefit gained is worth the price.
Neither has any responsible body determined whether some lesser taking would better
balance the diverse interests.").
See also Musiker et al., supra note 224, at 98 and supporting citations (saying some courts
"have advocated more of a balancing approach"); Babcock, Wetlands and Coastal Barrier
Beaches, supra note 217, at 46, n. 261 (discussing balancing under the public trust
doctrine); Bader, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 216, at 762 (criticizing the Mono Lake
court's use of the public trust doctrine as being "essentially procedural, with a weak
substantive component," "procedurally" requiring courts to do no more than direct
environmental decisionmakers to "embark upon a policy balancing analysis, and
substantively... [only] attempt to minimize environmental harms"). Bader argues that his
more muscular interpretation of the doctrine would require a court "to ask if the
proposed water diversions [from Mono Lake] posed a substantial threat to the diversity
and stability of the ecosystem for which the lake is a focal point," which would lead the
court into a variety of scientific inquiries, which, depending on their outcome, could
"obligate[d]" the court "to issue either an injunction or specific compliance orders
eliminating the threat posed by Los Angeles's water demands." Id. But see Meyers, Protection
of Wildlife, supra note 212, at 732 (interpreting Mono Lake as protecting the lake's
"biological and ecosystem integrity.., by requiring the state to reconsider its allocation of
water from the lake to Los Angeles County").
233. Eichenberg & Vestal, Improving the Legal Framework for Aquaculture, supra note 82,
at 349 (saying "trust lands may only be conveyed for purposes approved by the legislature
as public uses."). See also Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 123-24
(1966) (finding law authorizing commercial lease of state reserved land too vague to
authorize construction of ski area); Babcock, Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, supra
note 217, at 44-45 (saying the legislature must find the proposed conveyance in
furtherance of the public interest or will not destroy the public's interest in remaining
trust resources). Baer suggests that requiring specific legislative approval before trust
resources can be alienated "curtail[s] agency discretion" and gives "elected officials, not
agency bureaucrats" "the power to control trust resources," although this may allow too
much congressional interference in agency action. Susan D. Baer, The Public Trust Doctrine
- A Tool to Make Federal Administrative Agencies Increase Protection of Public Land and Its
Resources, 15 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 426 (1988).
234. Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 82, at 349; see also Musiker et al., supra note 224,
at 98 ("In sum, the Mono Lake decision stands for the proposition that state agencies
should undertake advance consideration of public trust values, act to preserve those
values, and continually supervise conduct that affects those values.").
235. Sax, Public Trust, supra note 215, at 490.
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Ocean fish ranching could contravene the public trust doctrine
in several ways. 2 6 First, an ocean fish rancher encloses portions of
the ocean with net pens for the purpose of commercially
cultivating fish. In doing so, she essentially claims an exclusive
right to use public resources (surface water, the water column, and
the ocean bottom), thus monopolizing trust resources for a private
use."7 A second conversion of public trust resources could occur if
ocean ranchers appropriate wild fish for their use as seed stock for
farmed fish when those fish would otherwise be available for public
fishing.23 A third potential violation of the doctrine may arise if
ocean fish ranching facilities interfere with traditional public trust
activities like fishing and navigation.239 To the extent that ocean
fish ranching runs afoul of the public trust doctrine, any
governmental action authorizing the closure could be nullified. At
a minimum a court would closely scrutinize that action to see if it
passes muster under its chosen standard for determining
legitimacy of a transfer of trust resources into private hands.
Although a strong case can thus be made that ocean fish
ranching violates the public trust doctrine, some states, especially
those that see an economic advantage in supporting the industry,24
may be unwilling to apply the doctrine in their waters. They could,
with some justification, argue that aquaculture fits comfortably
within the doctrine, since "fishing' '241 is a long recognized use of
236. See Dowie, Salmon and the Caesar, supra note 81, at 1 (describing the public trust
doctrine as "one of the biggest obstacles faced by the Bush Administration in its plan to
promote ocean aquaculture").
237. See Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatoy Commons, supra note 6, at 8 ("Aquaculture
is, in essence, an effort to privatize the classic common pool resources of fisheries.").
238. See Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 82, at 357-58 (raising this concern with
respect to the removal of shellfish from public waters for private cultivation).
239. Fernandez, Public Trust, Riparian Rights, and Aquaculture, supra note 16, at 297
(saying traditional fishers "argue that aquaculture conflicts with the public's right of
navigation and fishery").
240. See Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 82, at 354-55 (setting out aquaculturists'
argument "that the lease fees and economic benefits" should give aquaculture "priority
over conflicting uses for trust lands leases"); cf Gorina-Ysern, World Ocean Public Trust,
supra note 9, at 705 n.227 (blaming the failure to regulate overfishing on governments
having "to make decisions that reconcile the objectives of generating employment and
income with the imperative of conservation and rehabilitation of fish stocks").
241. However, aquaculture is more like farming than fishing because it involves
raising or cultivating animals not taking or capturing them, which is the essence of fishing.
See Pazolt v. Director of the Div. of Marine Fisheries, 631 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Mass. 1994)
(finding aquaculture not within boundaries of reserved right of public fishing, and saying
"[aiquaculture is a contemporary method of farming shellfish.... [I]t is not incidental to
or reasonably related to or a natural derivative of the public's right to fish"); see alsoJulia
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public trust resources. State courts may also find sufficient public
benefit associated with ocean fish ranching to compensate for the
"award of private use" rights, 242 choosing to let that benefit trump
the activity's adverse environmental and socioeconomic impacts.
However, whether or not a coastal state applies the public trust
doctrine to fish ranching within its territorial waters is beside the
point for the purposes of this article, which examines the question
of whether the doctrine attaches to the 200 mile federal EEZ. The
article now turns to that issue.
A. Extending the Public Trust Doctrine to the EEZ
Even though the oceans and their resources share the
attributes of classic public trust resources, making them an
excellent candidate for application of the public trust doctrine, it
is far from clear that the doctrine actually extends to the waters
and resources of the EEZ. The public trust doctrine has been used
largely at the state level as a creature of state common law to
protect state resources, 243 and there is almost no case law involving
M. Underwood, Intertidal Zone Aquaculture and the Public Trust Doctrine, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL
LJ. 383, 387-92 (1997) (analyzing Pazolt opinion); Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 82, at
354 (saying in any state that "narrowly adhere[s] to an historic interpretation of the public
trust doctrine," aquaculture would not be considered a traditional form of fishing). An
advantage of aquaculture being considered "fishing" is that the SFA would apply, and
NMFS and the Regional Councils would have to take "measures to prevent, mitigate or
minimize any adverse effects" from aquaculture activities on essential fish habitats.
Englebrecht, The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Act, supra note 4, at 1213-14
(internal citation omitted); cf Richard G. Hildreth, The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal and
Ocean Resources Management, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 221, 230 (1993) (saying "the public
trust doctrine provides little assistance in resolving ocean resource use conflicts, because..
. [it] does not assign priorities among the permissible public trust uses," and
recommending instead "specific rules of use priority" such as favoring renewable uses over
nonrenewable ones, non-exclusive uses over exclusive ones, or ocean dependent uses over
non-ocean dependent ones).
242. Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 82, at 354 (saying the "fees and economic
benefits . . . [from] aquaculture . . .improve the state's ability to manage its common
resource and increase the common wealth, resulting in a public benefit that adequately
compensates for the award of private use of public resources"); see also id. at 372 (saying
"[s] tates have an obligation to manage public trust lands to produce public benefits," and
recommending states consider a wide variety of benefits and costs, including "possibility of
incompatible uses (e.g., capture fishing, navigation, [and] public recreation) in making
this public benefits assessment").
243. See, e.g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 397 (1876) (sustaining Virginia law
prohibiting citizens from other states from seeding oysters in Virginia's tidal waters);
Dunham v. Lamphere, 69 Mass. 268 (1855) (upholding law banning purse seines within
one mile of Nantucket); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) (sustaining
state law limiting methods for catching menhaden); Blumm & Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit
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its application to federal trust resources. However, there are two
arguments that can be made for extending the public trust
doctrine to the EEZ. One may argue that there is a federal
common law public trust doctrine. Or, one may argue that state
regulatory authority over fisheries beyond their territorial waters
extends the state common law public trust doctrine to the EEZ.
1. The federal government has trust responsibilities in the EZ.
This part of the article posits that the public trust doctrine
attaches to the EEZ because the waters and ocean bottom in the
EEZ are public domain lands to which various trust doctrines
apply, 244 including the public trust doctrine. Alternatively, the
doctrine applies because it attaches to the wild fish that inhabit
these public domain waters. 24
The language of the Magnuson-Stevens Act giving the federal
government "sovereign rights" to exploit, conserve, and manage
the resources of the "seabed and subsoil and the superjacent
waters" makes it clear that the subsoil and waters of the EEZ are
within the public domain.24 Congress's explicit assumption "'of
and the Public Trust, supra note 18, at 695 (describing Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71, 75
(1855), as holding that Maryland's "proprietary interest in submerged lands" gave it
regulatory authority over "the taking of oysters embedded within its tidelands"); see also
Dowie, supra note 81, at 2 (quoting an unnamed New York state decision saying "[t]he
control and regulation of navigable waters and tideways was a matter of deep concern to
sovereign governments dating back to the Romans. . . . The entire ecological system
supporting the waterways is an integral part of them and must necessarily be included
within the purview of the trust.").
244. The tide that states have to the soils under navigable waters, "necessarily carries
with it control over the waters above them." Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452
(1892). A similar principle applies to the federal government. United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899) ("First, that, in the absence of specific
authority from congress, a state cannot, by its legislation, destroy the right of the United
States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters, so
far, at least, as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property;
second, that it is limited by the superior power of the general government to secure the
uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the limits of the United States.").
245. On possible constitutional sources for a federal public trust doctrine, see
United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding a basis for the public
trust doctrine in the Property Clause); Baer, supra note 232, at 424-425 (finding potential
constitutional support for the doctrine in the "penumbra of unenumerated rights" in the
Ninth Amendment).
246. See, e.g., Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation & Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C §§ 1801-1883, 1181 (Westlaw 2000) (extending exclusive United States fisheries
jurisdiction 200 miles offshore); Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983)
(asserting federal sovereignty over the natural resources of the EEZ); Am. Pelagic Fishing
Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (referring to the 1986
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sovereign rights and exclusive fishery management authority over
all fish' in the EEZ.... indisputably encompasses all rights to fish
in the EEZ. ' ' 24 7 Therefore, the EEZ is on a par with terrestrial lands
managed by the federal government; they are both within the
public domain.
However, arguing that the EEZ is within the public domain
does not automatically invoke the public trust doctrine because the
doctrine has rarely been applied to public lands.248 However, this is
because there is no need to apply the doctrine to terrestrial public
domain lands: a variety of federal laws already impose trust
obligations on the federal government with respect to those
lands.249 The federal government holds all of its lands and waters in
amendments to the Magnuson Act and saying "[p]ursuant to the Magnuson Act, the
'conservation and management of the EEZ' belongs to the sovereign, and this necessarily
includes the fight to fish in the zone"); Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 891 (1st
Cir. 1979) (finding that the Magnuson Act is "no less an assertion of a federal interest in
conserving fishery resources in the waters of the Outer Continental Shelf' than the
OCSLA itself was with respect to the development of oil and gas resources of the subsoil
and seabed in the same area); Parravano v. Babbitt, 861 F. Supp. 914, 928 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
afr'd, 70 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1995). ("Thus, the Magnuson Act confers on the Secretary of
Commerce authority to manage the fishery resources in the EEZ for conservation. It does
not confer on commercial fishermen any right or title in the fishery resources under the
Department of Commerce's authority."). Although the Magnuson Act allowed states to
retain regulatory jurisdiction over fisheries within their waters, the federal government can
intervene "if the Secretary [of Commerce] finds that state action or inaction . . . will
,substantially and adversely affect' an FMP covering a fishery that is predominately within
the EEZ." Christie, Living Marine Resources Management, supra note 12, at 164-65 (quoting
16 U.S.C. § 1856(b) (Westlaw 2000)).
247. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., 379 F.3d 1363, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
248. But see United States v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 710 F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (D. Neb.
1989) (finding the federal government could sue to recover for damages to one of its
wildfowl production areas as parens patriae, noting public trust doctrine has been applied
to the federal government, even though it has more "traditionally been asserted by the
States"); City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 632 F. Supp. 333, 335-37, 341 (N.D. Cal.
1985) (applying public trust doctrine to void conveyance by United States of former
tidelands to a private party and imposing on federal government the duty "to hold the
land in trust for navigation and public use"); United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F.
Supp. 120, 124-25 (D. Mass. 1981) (holding public trust doctrine restricted both
Massachusetts' and federal government's prerogatives with respect to submerged lands);
In re Steuart Transp. Co, 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (relying on public trust and
parens patriae doctrines to allow federal recovery of damages for wildlife killed by oil spill
and saying "state of Virginia and the United States have the fight and duty to protect and
preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife resources"); cf Palila v. Haw. Dep't of
Land & Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 n.40 (D. Haw. 1979), ("The importance of
preserving such a natural resource [an endangered species] may be of such magnitude as
to rise to the level of a federal property interest.").
249. See Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 866 (D. Colo. 1985) (finding "the
government has a duty under [the public trust doctrine] to protect and preserve
[wilderness] for the public's common heritage," but since the Wilderness Act already
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trust for the citizens of the United States, -5 and courts have
repeatedly impressed these statutory trust duties on federal
agencies with respect to their public resources management
decisions. 25I
imposed public trust duties on the Secretary the doctrine was not necessary to protect
these particular trust resources); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C.
1980) (finding the Secretary of Interior's trust duties to manage national park resources
indistinguishable from his statutory duties and any distinction between them
"unfounded"); Conservation Law Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1480 n.8 (D. Mass.
1984) (finding a consideration of "general implied public trust duties... inconsequential"
in light of the National Park Services' statutory duties to protect Cape Cod National
Seashore, even while recognizing agency had duty to see that "none of the public domain
is wasted"); see also Baer, supra note 232, at 393-400 (analyzing various laws, including the
Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (Westlaw 1982), the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (Westlaw 1982 & Supp.
IV 1986), the National Park Service Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-460 (Westlaw 1982 & Supp. III
1985), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Westlaw 1982 & Supp. III 1985), as examples of where Congress
"implicitly delegated to various federal administrative agencies the power to protect public
trust property"). Baer also identifies language in the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Westlaw 1982 & Supp. IV 1986), that refers to the federal
government's intergenerational responsibilities. Id. at 393 n.56 (citing 16 U.S.C. §1453
(Westlaw 1982)). The Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1336 (Westlaw 1982 & Supp. IV
1986), and the National Environmental Policy Act, 3342 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (Westlaw
1982 & Supp. Il 1985), both contain language that imposes a duty on the federal
government to preserve for present and future generations the benefits of these statutory
regimens. Id.; see Cathy J. Lewis, The Timid Approach of the Federal Courts to the Public Trust
Doctrine: Justified Reluctance or Dereliction of Duty ?, 19 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 51, 69 (1998)
(suggesting that courts "could find a trust duty under NEPA... easily... [and then] build
upon NEPA's trust language to construct a public trust duty" for federal agencies, in this
case the Forest Service).
250. Even before these laws were enacted, courts considered that the federal
government had trust responsibilities over the public domain and that these lands "should
be protected for future generations." Baer, supra note 232, at 391-92 (citing Knight v.
United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891) impressing on the Secretary of the
Interior, as "guardian of the people of the United States over the public lands," the duty
neither to waste those lands nor to dispose of them to people who were not entitled to
them); see also Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) (finding federal
government had trust responsibilities over the national forests on behalf of "the people of
the whole country"); United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170
(1890) (noting that the United States' land is "held in trust for all the people"); United
States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 (1888) (noting that the federal government holds public
domain lands in trust, and saying "[t]he government is charged with the duty, and clothed
with the power, to protect it [the public domain] from trespass and unlawful
appropriation").
251. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep't of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (following holding in Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 124 U.S. 161 (1891), that
Secretary of Interior is bound both by statutory duties to protect national park resources
and the public trust); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (upholding federal
government's authority over wild horses and burros on federal lands under the Property
Clause); Light, 220 U.S. at 537 (saying "it is for Congress to determine" how the trust will
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The government's statutory trust responsibilities over its lands
mirror those underlying the common law public trust doctrine.
Whenever the federal government decides to sell, lease, permit, or
develop these lands in any way, it has a duty to protect the public
interest in them.252 With limited exceptions, these lands are
accessible to the public253  and not available for individual
appropriation. The government's responsibilities over these lands
are irrevocable,2 54 and the public can call the government to
account if it shirks its trust responsibilities. 5 In such situations,
applying the common law public trust doctrine would be
redundant, since a statutory responsibility is functionally
equivalent. Therefore, it is no surprise that no court has ever
specifically applied the doctrine to federal public lands. However,
no pervasive federal regulatory program exists to protect the
resources of the EEZ, thus necessitating the application of the
public trust doctrine.
256
It is no answer to conflate the absence of judicial
implementation of the federal common law version of this
doctrine with an indication that no such doctrine exists. In other
words, merely because public lands are already protected under
laws that contain equivalent trust concepts does not mean that
there is no federal public trust doctrine.2 57 No federal court has
be administered).
252. See, e.g., the Federal Land Policy & Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1713
(authorizing the sale of public domain lands only where "disposal of such tract[s] will
serve important public objectives").
253. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) (holding the federal
government can prevent construction of fence on private land if the effect is to enclose
public lands); United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding the federal government, as trustee of nation's public lands, can prevent the
owner of an unpatented mine claim from restricting public access to, and recreational use
of, the surface of his claim).
254. Knight, 142 U.S. at 181 ("The secretary is the guardian of the people of United
States over the public lands. The obligations of his oath of office oblige him to see that the
law is carried out, and that none of the public domain is wasted or is disposed of to a party
not entitled to it. He represents the government, which is a party in interest in every case
involving the surveying and disposal of the public lands.").
255. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep't of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(finding Department of Interior had both a statutory and a trust duty to conserve scenery
and natural resources, including wildlife).
256. See supra Part I.D.
257. See District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(saying the court "must determine whether the public trust duties that have been
recognized under state law as pertaining to state governments also apply to the federal
government when it holds title to the shores and bed of a river"). While the court declined
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ever abrogated the doctrine or said that it does not apply to public
lands should there be a reason to invoke it. The doctrine in its
original incarnation applied to the King, and although in this
country the doctrine became a feature of state law, that is because
the people took on the attributes of sovereignty, which then passed
to the states. 258 However, since "federal and state governments each
exist for the benefit of the members of the public each serves," and
each "holds title to land and natural resources as a representative
of members of the public each serves, 2 59 there seem to be good
to apply the doctrine to the federal government in that case because the argument was
raised for the first time on appeal, it cited 1.58 Acres of Land, and Steuart as proof that
federal courts have applied it to the federal government. Id. at 1083-84; see Baer, supra note
232, at 408 (saying the absence of the federal government from the case and the possibility
that the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act "may preempt all, or part, of the
[government's] alleged federal common law duties" also persuaded the court not to
entertain the District's public trust argument); see also Dowie, Salmon and the Caesar, supra
note 81, at 3 (saying the Supreme Court's failure to declare the public trust doctrine
federal common law "doesn't mean the public trust doctrine is not federal; it just means it
has never been established as such"). But see Eric Pearson, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Federal Law, 24J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 173, 175 (2004) (saying "to the extent [the
federal public trust doctrine] has force and effect in federal law at all, [it] supplements
federal power rather than restricts it," and in this respect is quite "divergent" from the
doctrine under state law).
258. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) ("[W]hen the Revolution
took place, the people of each State became themselves sovereign; and in that character
held the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their
own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the
general government.").
259. Pearson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Federal Law, supra note 256, at 177. Pearson
also points out that the Property Clause basis for the federal government to manage public
lands "is essentially indistinguishable from the constitutional authority" for the states'
police power and that both authorities "are exceedingly broad." Id. But see Baer, supra note
232, at 423 n.302 (citing Nevada v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166, 172 (D. Nev. 1981)
(distinguishing the federal government's trust responsibilities over the country's natural
resources from those of a private trustee with respect to the assets it holds) and Alabama v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 277 (1954) (Reed, J., concurring) (making same distinction)). See also
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979), quoted in Lewis, Public Trust Doctrine,
supra note 248, at 69 ("The ... Court characterized the Secretary of the Interior as the
'guardian' of the public domain, 'whose legal duty embraces a solemn responsibility to see
that the great life systems of the ocean are not unreasonably jeopardized by activities
undertaken to extract oil and gas from the seabed."'); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United
States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917) ("[I]nclusion within a state of lands of the United States
does not take from Congress the power to control their occupancy and use, to protect
them from trespass and injury, and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may
obtain rights in them .... "); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) ("[W]hile
the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been
definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that '[t]he power over the public land
thus entrusted to Congress is without limitation.'" (quoting United States v. San Francisco,
310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940))).
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arguments that the doctrine could apply to the federal waters of
the EEZ.
However, for there to be a federal common law of public trust,
the activity or subject matter area must be one where courts can
create federal common law. Courts do not create federal common
law lightly. 2 ° In fact, they only do so when "a federal rule of
decision is 'necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,"' or
where Congress has explicitly "given the courts power to develop
substantive law."261 Since Congress has not empowered the courts
to develop substantive law with respect to aquaculture, only the
first rationale holds any promise.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the first rationale as
requiring a showing that "our federal system does not permit the
controversy to be resolved under state law, either because the
authority and duties of the United States as sovereign are
intimately involved or because the interstate or international
nature of the controversy makes it inappropriate for state law to
control. '26 2 Thus, for there to be a federal common law of public
trust, the courts "must find that a federally recognized public trust
doctrine implicates 'uniquely federal interests,' and where 'the
authority and duties of the United States as sovereign are
intimately involved,' such a unique federal interest can be
found., 263 It is not hard to see that "uniquely federal interests" are
involved on the EEZ. The mere possibility that interstate, or even
international, controversies, which only the federal government
260. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981) (saying
federal rights are created either by Congress, "expressly or by clear implication," or by
federal courts in limited circumstances); see also Lewis, supra note 248, at 71 ("The
Supreme Court has recognized the need and authority of courts to fashion federal
common law in a 'few and restricted' instances." (quoting Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at
640)).
261. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 640 (internal citations omitted).
262. Id. at 641.
263. J. Wallace Malley, Jr. & Jeffrey M. Silverstein, The Public Trust Doctrine and Federal
Condemnation: A Call for Recognition of a Federal Common Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 501, 520-521
(1991). The development of this line of argument owes much to Malley and Silverstein's
article, notwithstanding that they apply the doctrine to public lands that the federal
government wants to condemn and turn over to private interests, rather than to the EEZ.
Lewis argues that the restrictions on fashioning federal common law should not apply
because "the roots of the public trust doctrine are believed to reach back to the
constitution, or to the State Enabling Acts." Lewis, supra note 248, at 63 n. 68 (citing
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine, 19
ENvTL. L. 425, 458-59 (1989) (saying the doctrine derives from statehood acts or from the
Commerce Clause, like the navigational servitude which then passed to the states upon
statehood)).
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can resolve, could arise on the EEZ should be sufficient to create a
"uniquely federal interest" in the area. Additionally, the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, the Endangered Species Act, and other
comparable statutes create uniquely federal duties in those
waters.26
While Congress can always oust federal common law, until
that happens federal courts can continue to create federal
common law and apply it.266 Here there are no preemptive federal
264. Malley and Silverstein additionally maintain that Illinois Central RR "seems to
suggest that a sovereign's duty to observe the trust may never be lost;" therefore, federal
condemnation of that property merely transfers that duty to the federal sovereign for as
long as it holds the land. Malley, Jr. & Silverstein, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 262, at
521. They also propose two other theories that might justify a federal common law public
trust doctrine: the first theory would consider the state and federal governments co-
trustees, with the federal government having dominant power in any situation where its
interests might conflict with those of the state's, relying on United States v. 1.58 Acres of
Land, 423 F. Supp. 120, 123 (D. Mass. 1981); the second theory would recognize the
United States as a "temporary" sole trustee until the land passes back to the state, relying
on Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893) and United States v. 11.037 Acres of Land, 685 F. Supp.
214 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Malley, Jr. & Silverstein, supra note 262, at 521-23; see also Peter Egan,
Applying Public Trust Tests to Congressional Attempts to Close National Park Areas, 25 B.C.
ENrL. AFF. L. REv. 717, 729 (1998) (saying since "[t]he federal government was created
by the individual states .... [it] cannot have powers superior to bodies responsible for its
creation. . . . [and] [t]herefore, like the states . . .cannot abdicate its public trust
responsibilities"); Wilkinson, Headwaters of the Public Trust, supra note 262, at 453-54
(finding the Court's ubiquitous references to "a state" and the absence of citations to any
particular state law asjustifying his belief the opinion relied on federal law).
265. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1980) (recognizing the
existence of federal common law but holding passage of the Clean Water Act with its
pervasive regulatory program sufficiently occupied the field to displace a federal common
law nuisance action). As the Court explained in Milwaukee, "when Congress addresses a
question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law, the need for
such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears." Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. at 314. A second prudential doctrine, abstention, might lead federal courts to
decline to hear public trust claims. See United States Reserve Mining Co., 394 F. Supp. 233
(D. Minn. 1974), cited in Lewis, supra note 248, at 73 (describing the case as holding that a
public trust claim involving water pollution was "best left to the state courts to develop").
However, the courts generally find abstention to be appropriate in only three limited
situations, none of which would apply here: the Burford exception arising where "'difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar,"'; the Pullman exception where federal
constitutional questions are presented "'which might be mooted or presented in a
different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law,"'; and the Younger
exception, which applies only when state criminal proceedings are involved. Lewis, supra
note 248, at 74 (discussing the application of abstention to federal public trust claims)
(internal citations omitted).
266. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) (referring to federal
common law of nuisance and saying that until "new federal laws and new federal
regulations ... pre-empt the field .... federal courts will be empowered to appraise the
equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution").
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laws involving the management of fishery resources in the EEZ;267
Congress has neither spoken directly to the issue nor occupied the
field. 68 Congressional regulation of fishery resources in the EEZ is
piecemeal, occasionally creating overlapping agency jurisdictions
or areas where there is no regulation at all.269 Thus, there is no
immediate danger of a federal common law public trust doctrine
being ousted from the EEZ by a "comprehensive regulatory
program supervised by an expert administrative agency. ''270 Unlike
areas of federal regulation such as water pollution, where the
federal government has essentially "occupied the field [so] as to
displace" federal common law,27' in the fishery context there are,
in fact, significant "interstices" that need to be filled by the use of a
federal common law doctrine.272
A second basis for finding that the federal government has
trust responsibilities over the EEZ and its resources is through the
wildlife trust.2 73 Although the idea that states own wildlife,
including fish, 74 was overturned in Hughes v. Oklahoma,275 the
267. See supra pp. 30-32. [discussion lack of federal regulatory programs]
268. See Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 313 (saying federal common law applies "[w]hen
Congress has not spoken to a particular issue").
269. See infra Part W.A.
270. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317.
271. Malley, Jr. & Silverstein, supra note 262, at 526.
272. See id. (citing Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 324, for the proposition that "[n]o
interstices remained to be filled by the continued use of federal common law" in the
context of the Clean Water Act); see also Lewis, supra note 248, at 59 (commenting that the
federal courts' reluctance "to embrace the public trust doctrine is not warranted" because
federal statutes have not "wholly occupied" the field of water resources management and
that "the finding of a duty on the part of a federal agency is entirely appropriate and a
proper complement to existing state law where the threatened harm is not addressed by a
state resource protection statute," and thus there is no need for courts to abstain).
273. See generally Wood, supra note 222, at 608; Babcock, Protecting Where the Wild
Things Are, supra note 217, at 882.
274. See, e.g., People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374, 399-400 (Cal. 1897)
(enjoining operation of private sawmill that was polluting the Truckee River, and saying
"[t]he fish within our waters, constitute the most important constituent of that species of
property commonly designated as wild game, the general right and ownership of which is
in the people of the State . . . ; and the right and power to protect and preserve such
property for the common use and benefit is one of the recognized prerogatives of the
sovereign, coming to us from the common law ...."); Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 57
(Alaska 1996) ("[S]almon are public assets of the state which may not be appropriated by
initiative."); Attorney Gen. v. Hermes, 339 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)
(authorizing state to bring civil action for damages for unlawful taking of perch and
whitefish from public waters because the "state is 'public trustee' of these resources, which
are held in trust for all the people of the state in their collective capacity"); see also Blumm
& Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust, supra note 162, at 708 n.236 (listing state
cases that have 'Judicially endorsed ... wildlife trust principles," including many involving
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concept of a wildlife trust still has currency today.276 In American
jurisprudence, the "rule of wildlife capture . . . has always been
fitted to meet the felt necessities of societies that employed it....
[and] has always been restrained by state authority., 277 This state
authority includes the wildlife trust doctrine because "the rule of
capture and the wildlife trust are inextricably tied, and they have
been-in one form or another-for centuries., 27" Thus, to the
extent the application of the rule of capture has given fishers
fish). Wood suggests using the wildlife trust to interpret federal laws to "force a sea-
change" in how the FWS implements section 7(a) (2) of the Endangered Species Act by
limiting the agency's discretion. Wood, supra note 222, at 613, 617-18 (saying the "[t]he
sheer scope of ESA federal regulation now demands" application of "broader trust
principles," displacing whatever claims states might have to regulatory primacy).
275. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). The state ownership doctrine held sway until the early
twentieth century when the Court began to reject it, first as "a slender reed," Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (sustaining constitutionality of Migratory Bird Treaty
Act), then as "a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a
State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource,"
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948) (rejecting the notion of exclusive state
authority over shrimp), then as "pure fantasy," Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc, 431 U.S.
265, 284 (1977), until finally in it was firmly overturned in Hughes. Macinko & Bromley,
Seeking Coherence from Legal and Economic Doctrines, 28 VT. L. REV. 623, 630-31 (2004)
(summarizing the state ownership doctrine's "demise"). Macinko and Bromley believe that
even though the "popular legacy" of the doctrine's death says it is about ownership of
wildlife, its end was not about who owned fish, but about federalism. Id. at 633-34
("Ownership of wildlife, by the states, is problematic not so much because it is ownership
of an elusive object (ferae naturae), but because it can be used as an advantage in the age-
old struggle between state and federal authority that is federalism.").
276. See Blumm & Ritchie, Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, supra
note 215, at 352 n. 205 (characterizing Supreme Court opinions "dismiss[ing] the state
ownership doctrine" as "narrow, overriding the states' proprietary interest in wildlife only
when it conflicts with federal law"); Blumm & Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust,
supra note 18, at 706 ("[Hughes] did not dislodge the states' trustee relation with wildlife
that had been confirmed in Geer."); Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species,
and What Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute
"Takings"?, 80 IOwA L. REv. 297, 311 n.77 (1995) (saying Hughes "did not, and could not,
overrule principles dating back to Roman Law" and that "[tihe trust analogy announced
in Geer ... remains the most accurate expression of this state interest"); Wood, supra note
222, at 609 n.17 (distinguishing between the "derivative" state ownership doctrine and the
"broad principles of sovereign trust over wildlife").
277. Blumm & Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust, supra note 18, at 720. For
a more thorough discussion of the origins of the rule of capture and its development and
replacement by the state ownership of wildlife doctrine, see generally Blumm & Ritchie,
The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust, supra note 18.
278. Id. at 720; see also Dale Goble, Three Cases/Four Tales: Commons, Capture, the Public
Trust, and Property in Land, 35 ENVrL. L. 807 (2005) (examining the rule of capture). The
rule of capture is best set out in "the American keystone" case of Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), involving a hapless fox and setting out the principle that "the first to
control property acquires ownership of it." Frank Lupo, The Rule of Capture and Its
Consequences, 35 ENVrL. L. 647, 647 (2005).
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ownership of fish, that ownership has long been constrained by
trust concepts, most importantly the sovereign's duty to protect the
trust res-fish.
The existence of a wildlife trust means that the government
exercises its power over wildlife for the public's benefit, and not
for its own interests or for the benefit of private entities.2 79 Wood
suggests that the doctrine's "foundational principles apply to
protecting biodiversity as a whole," not just game animals,20 its
traditional focus. 28' In this, the wildlife trust doctrine and the
public trust doctrine are parallel. 212 "The public trust doctrine
protects natural resources, and therefore the public, from the
failure of legislatures, state agencies, and administrative personnel
279. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896), quoted in Macinko & Bromley,
Seeking Coherence from Legal and Economic Doctrines, supra note 274, at 630; see also Babcock,
Protecting Where the Wild Things Are, supra note 217, at 885-86 (saying when the Court
overruled Geer in Hughes, it pointedly left the concept of a state wildlife trust standing);
Goble, Three Cases/Four Tales, supra note 277, at 853 ("[T]he public's interest in wildlife -
whether characterized as a trust, state ownership, state custodianship, or a 'substantial
interest in preserving' such animals - gives the state a special authority and responsibility
to ensure the preservation of wildlife.").
280. However, the wildlife trust doctrine's traditional focus on protecting harvesting
of game as a "valuable food supply," has direct application to protecting valuable food
supply of wild fish. Geer, 161 U.S. at 534.
281. Wood, supra note 222, at 611; see also id. at 643 (saying "[a] trust framework
treats biodiversity as a natural asset held in trust by the sovereign for the benefit of the
public, including both present and future generations," imposing on the sovereign trustee
the "continuing and inalienable duty to protect the corpus of the trust"); Johnson &
Galloway, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 212, at 30 (saying the public trust doctrine
"has a great potential for protecting biodiversity"); Bader, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note
216, at 756 (advocating using public trust doctrine "to maintain the general health of natural
systems"); Goble, supra note 277, at 853 (finding "ample power to conserve the nation's
biodiversity and the ecosystem services on which we depend").
282. See Wood, supra note 222, at 608 ( "The wildlife trust doctrine [is] a branch of
the well-known public trust doctrine ...."); Blumm & Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the
Public Trust, supra note 18, at 714 ( "[B]ecause the sovereign trusteeship over wildlife is
part of a larger body of law concerning 'public trust' principles that developed outside the
context of wildlife regulation, public trust law remains directly relevant to states' wildlife
trust responsibilities."); id. at 695 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76
(Curtis, J.) (holding that the state's power over harvesting of oysters "results from the
ownership of the soil, from the legislative jurisdiction of the State over it, and from the
duty to preserve unimpaired those public uses for which the soil is held")); Meyers,
Protection of Wildlife, supra note 212, at 729 (noting similarities between wildlife and water
because neither can be owned and to the extent they can be owned, ownership is an
attribute of sovereignty); id. (citing Geer, 161 U.S. at 525, for the proposition that wildlife
is a type of community property that, "having no owner, [was] considered as belonging in
common to all citizens of the state"); Macinko, Public or Private: U.S. Commercial Fisheries,
supra note 26, at 940 ("The core meaning of the public trust doctrine is found in the class
relations of old world game laws... [and] in a 19th century struggle between populist and
progressive visions for the American political economy.").
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to recognize the state's duty to protect the corpus of the wildlife
trust for future generations.
2 8 3
Furthermore, the concept of a wildlife trust, like the public
trust doctrine, is not restricted to the states. Wood asserts that
"[state] cases make clear that the wildlife trust arises as an attribute
of sovereignty" and thus should apply to the federal, as well as
state, sovereign. 284 She argues, with respect to the species listed
under the Endangered Species Act, that the federal government
has "a public trustee's duty of care" arising out of its assertion of
regulatory authority over those species, and that those species, in
turn, are "definable [trust] asset[s]. . . and are owed traditional
protections deriving from property law accorded to public natural
assets. 2 5 The same rationale should apply to fish given the
existence of analogous federal legislation protecting fish.2 6
Thus, while
[t]he issue of the existence of the federal public trust doctrine
has not yet been settled by the courts; arguably the federal
government should be subject to the same fiduciary responsibility
as the state governments in managing the resource for the
benefit of the public, and should not be able to terminate public
interests or convey an interest in this property without an explicit
finding of public benefit.
28 7
2. Alternatively, the state-based public trust doctrine extends to the
EEZ.
Courts and commentators appear to agree that the public trust
doctrine applies to "the three nautical mile belt created by the
SLA" around the United States coastline, even though the statute
is silent about imposing public trust obligations on states.288 If one
283. Musiker et al., supra note 224, at 109.
284. Wood, supra note 222, at 614-15; see also id. at 616 (quoting Charles F.
Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 299
(1980) ("Thus we can expect courts today, like courts in earlier eras, to characterize
Congress' modem legislative scheme as imposing a public trust on the public
resources.")).
285. Wood, supra note 222, at 616-17.
286. See, e.g., Murphy v. Dept. of Natural Res., 837 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (S.D. Fla.
1993) (saying Congress intended the Submerged Lands Act "to further the Public Trust
Doctrine"); cf Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 546 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding federal
government had trust responsibility to protect tribal fisheries under the Magnuson Act).
287. Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 82, at 347.
288. Hildreth, supra note 240, at 229; see also id. (saying there is little debate about
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adopts the view that the public trust doctrine is a creature of state
common law, the challenge becomes finding sufficient state
presence in the waters of the EEZ for its application."9 That basis
can be found both in the states' historical and continuing
regulatory presence over fisheries-including those found in the
EEZ"9-and in the authority the CZMA gives to states, allowing
them to disapprove of a federal activity that will affect their coastal
zones in a way that is inconsistent with their coastal zone
management plans ("CZMPs"). 291 To the extent that coastal states
have explicitly or implicitly incorporated public trust principles
into their CZMPs, and fish ranching activities will affect individual
states' coastal zones, then these principles will extend to
applications by ocean fish ranchers for federal authorization to
conduct their activities in the EEZ. Each of these points is
developed more fully below.
A "significant proportion of fisheries resources occur within
state waters," and decisions about how those resources are to be
managed have profound social and economic effects on local
communities.292 As a result, states have historically managed
the doctrine applying to "state internal waters," such as estuaries, bays, embayments, and
sounds, i.e. those waters "landward of the baseline from which the U.S. territorial sea is
measured").
289. Lewis argues that federal courts can apply state common law public trust
doctrine principles in diversity cases (citing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), noting that most public trust claims heard by courts have been in diversity cases).
Lewis, supra note 248, at 59-60.
290. See, e.g. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation & Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C § 1856(b) (Westlaw 2006) (retaining state jurisdiction to manage fish stocks within
state territorial waters and preempting that jurisdiction only when Secretary of Commerce
finds state action or inaction will adversely affect implementation of fish management plan
for a fishery that is predominantly within the EEZ); see id. § 1856(a) (3) (authorizing states
to regulate fishing vessels outside state territorial waters under certain circumstances);
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (Westlaw 2006) (granting states "title
to and ownership of ... natural resources," including the "right and power to manage,
administer, lease, develop, and use" marine resources). See also Christie, Living Marine
Resources Management, supra note 12, at 164-68 (describing federal and state jurisdiction
over fishery resources).
291. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (Westlaw 2006)
(requiring that federal actions affecting a state's coastal zone be consistent with that state's
coastal zone management plans to the maximum extent practicable).
292. Christie, Living Marine Resources Management, supra note 12, at 164. Commons
scholars, like Ostrom and McCay, have searched for alternative solutions to privatization
and regulation as a means of avoiding the despoliation of the commons, most frequently
turning to local control emanating from the communities that depend on fishing for their
livelihoods. But these solutions have problems as well. What may be sufficient to solve the
problems of a local fishery for a discrete species fails when extended to regional, let alone
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fisheries whether or not the fish were within their waters, and have
retained regulatory authority over fish that leave their waters and
travel into the EEZ.29' This authority continues so long as there is
either no federal Fisheries Management Plan ("FMP") or other
preemptive federal regulation, or when there is an FMP or federal
regulation consistent with state law.294 Courts have held that where
there is no conflict with federal or international law, "a state's
interest in preserving nearby fisheries is sufficiently strong to
permit such extra-territorial enforcement of its laws enacted for
that purpose. 2'95 Fishing boats registered under state law remain
within that state's regulatory jurisdiction, even when those boats
fish in the EEZ. 95
Briscoe writes that regulation of fisheries "provides the classic
model for extra-territorial exercise of the police power. '297 Thus, "a
state may reasonably extend its jurisdiction to control fish and
game resources outside the limited area of its territorial
sovereignty, if such an exercise is based on the conservation
principles inherent in their [fish's] migratory characteristics. '"298
In addition, states, under the aegis of their coastal zone
national or international fisheries for many different species. See Buzbee, Recognizing the
Regulatory Commons, supra note 6, at 25 (saying "oceans and their resources are an obvious.
. .mismatch" with the regulatory authority); Christie, Living Marine Resources Management,
supra note 12, at 112 (discussing inability of states to manage distant water and foreign
fishing fleets).
293. See Christie, Living Marine Resources Management, supra note 12, at 111; see also
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (recognizing a state's right to regulate fishing
by its citizens beyond state waters, saying "If the United States may control the conduct of
its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may not likewise
govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the
State has a legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress"); see also
id. (quoting State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 552, 554-56 (Alaska 1976) (holding that the
importance of a crab fishery gave the state "legitimate interest" in its offshore regulation)).
294. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (3) (A) (Westlaw 2006). Even after the Magnuson Act was
amended in 1996, considerable confusion remained over the extent to which federal law
preempted state laws regulating fishing boats by continuing to allow states significant
regulatory authority over these boats, including boats not registered under their laws.
Christie, Living Marine Resources Management, supra note 12, at 165-66. But see id. at 166
n.428 (noting several courts have found more restrictive state regulations "inconsistent"
with the limits set in a FMP).
295. People v. Weeren, 26 Cal.3d 654, 666 (1980), cited inJohn Briscoe, The Effect of
President Reagan's 12-Mile Territorial Sea Proclamation on the Boundaries and Extraterritorial
Powers of the Coastal States, 2 TERRITORIAL SEAJ. 225, 278 (1992).
296. Christie, Living Marine Resources Management, supra note 12, at 165.
297. Briscoe, supra note 294, at 278.
298. Bundrant, 546 P.2d at 554, quoted in Briscoe, supra note 292, at 278; but see id.
n. 114 (questioning the decision's viability after the Magnuson Act).
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management programs, can determine the consistency of federal
activities in the EEZ with their laws.299 For example, the CZMA's
consistency provisions have been applied to offshore oil and gas
leasing programs in the waters off Massachusetts. °  and
California."' Ocean fish ranching can directly affect fishery
resources in the coastal zone through disease, pollution, and
escaped fish, as well as the economic livelihood of coastal fishing
communities. Therefore, these impacts should be cognizable
under the CZMA." 2
Many states have incorporated public trust principles into their
laws, and, in some cases, their constitutions."3 To the extent that
these laws are part of the "enforceable policies"0 4 of an approved
state coastal zone management plan, then state common law
public trust principles incorporated into those plans extend to the
EEZ. These principles can be applied to stop ocean fish ranching
activities that prevent access to the waters and resources of the EEZ
on the ground that such limitations are inconsistent with the
state's coastal zone management plan. In the alternative, these
principles might also be used to reform fish ranching activities. For
instance, the state could move the location of the net pens so that
299. See Briscoe, supra note 294, at 283-85 (discussing the reach of the CZMA to
federal activities beyond state waters, and noting that passage of the SLA "enhanced" the
states' consistency powers by dropping language from that act which had limited a state's
consistency power to federal activities directly affecting their coastal zones); see also
Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1204 (saying federal consistency review "is required for any
federally funded or authorized project located in the Exclusive Economic Zone .... [thus
affording states] some say in the regulatory process for aquaculture projects in federal
waters adjacent to their boundaries").
300. Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1983), cited in
Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 274.
301. Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987), cited in Schatzberg, supra
note 5, at 275.
302. See Schatzberg, supra note 5, at 275-76 (saying that because of the "risks"
associated with ocean aquaculture, "offshore salmon fish farming may affect Alaska's and
Washington's coastal zones in ways inconsistent with the habitat protection goals included
in both states' enforceable policies").
303. See, e.g., Owsichek v. State Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 493
(Alaska 1988) (noting that the purpose of the Alaska Constitution's "common use" clause
"was achieved by constitutionalizing common law principles imposing upon the state a
public trust duty with regard to the management of fish, wildlife and waters"); Dowie, supra
note 81, at 2 (saying that Louisiana, among other states, wrote the public trust doctrine
"directly" into its constitution).
304. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1) (A) (Westlaw 2006) (Each Federal agency activity within
or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water use or natural resource of the
coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent
practicable with the enforceable policies of approved State management programs.)
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they do not interfere with commercial fishing, thereby ensuring
consistency with the public trust. In summary, the public trust
doctrine can apply to ocean aquaculture on any of several
grounds: (1) the EEZ is federal land to which the public trust
attaches; (2) there is an independent federal common law
doctrine; (3) state common law doctrine applies to the waters of
the EEZ because state regulatory authority extends into the EEZ;
or (4) state common law doctrine applies to the waters of the EEZ
because of the operation of the CZMA.
V. APPLYING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE WOULD FILL A
REGULATORY GAP AND MAKES GOOD POLICY SENSE
Currently, there is no effective and comprehensive regulatory
regime governing ocean fish ranching. °5 There is no clear sense of
"which laws apply and which agency is accountable for oversight at
different stages of aquaculture ventures.""' The current
"piecemeal approach [to ocean fish ranching] has resulted in gaps
and inefficiency."0 7 Applying the public trust doctrine would
protect ocean resources from the adverse impacts of fish ranching
until a comprehensive, effective regulatory program evolves to fill
those gaps-something privatizing those resources cannot do.0 s
Further, applying the public trust doctrine makes good policy
sense, as it "imposes a duty" on government to protect natural
resources that exceeds any it has under specific enabling laws or
police power authority.
3 9
305. Englebrecht, supra note 4, at 1199 (saying "this piecemeal approach has left
many environmental impacts overlooked, particularly the protection of essential marine
habitat"); Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 6, at 9 ("The mixed-media
nature of aquaculture and its risks, coupled with the lack of any one prime regulator, has
to date left aquaculture subject to incomplete and arguably ineffective regulation.").
Buzbee goes on to say that the emergence of a primary regulator seems unlikely given the
fact that there is no governmental institution with the jurisdictional reach to address the
broad ecosystem risks of aquaculture, id. at 9-10, and "potential regulators have few
incentives to see aquaculture as an attractive subject of regulation." Id. at 10.
306. Englebrecht, The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Act, supra note 4, at 1203.
307. Id at 1202.
308. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986); James L.
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19
ENVrL. L. 527 (1989) (saying that the expansion of the doctrine's scope has taken it
beyond its legal roots in property law); See generally supra Part II. The realization that there
is a regulatory gap should quell objections by some scholars to the use of the public trust
doctrine where there are effective regulatory frameworks.
309. Musiker, supra note 224, at 114-15 (saying that this duty "extends beyond any
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A. The Disabling Effect of Regulatory Gaps
The regulatory context for ocean fish ranching exemplifies
what Professor Buzbee labels a "regulatory commons." A regulatory
commons arises when more than one potential regulator shares
potential jurisdiction over "a regulatory opportunity" and there is
"a mismatch" between the regulators' jurisdictions and the
injurious activity's causes and effects.31° In other words, "the
underlying social ill . .. lacks a matching political-legal regime. '
A regulatory commons is problematic because it means that those
searching for regulation will "fragment" their demands because
they will not know where to go to get relief, 31 thus unintentionally
diminishing the regulator's perception that there is a problem that
she should address. A regulatory commons also creates
disincentives for regulators to step in and take initiative, leaving
some "social ills" under-regulated or entirely unregulated. 13
duty imposed under the police power, constitution, or statutes"); id. at 109 (commenting
that "recent threats to state and federal legislative protections may trigger a greater need
to harness this elusive doctrine to protect the wildlife resource"); see also id. at 114
(distinguishing between NEPA, requiring that government agencies only "consider a range
of alternatives" to the proposed action, and the public trust doctrine, imposing a duty on
agencies to "adopt the most feasible alternative that will least impair the corpus of the
trust," and also saying that courts applying the doctrine are not constrained by the
"parameters embodied in the language of the statutes").
310. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 6, at 6 (defining a
"'regulatory opportunity' as a commons resource"). But see Buzbee, Contextual
Environmental Federalism, supra note 6, at 122-26 (extolling some "benefits of regulatory
overlap and interaction," and saying they can actually "reduce[s] the risk of the regulatory
commons problem of inattention or inaction" and "provide a valuable antidote to inaction
incentives").
311. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 6, at 13.
312. Id. at 6 (saying a regulatory commons, with its "fragmented political-legal
structures that do not match a social ill in cause or effect" provides opportunities for those
opposing regulation to "exploit this complexity," and like "fragmented property interests
that predictably lead to underinvestment in anticommons property .... [,]prompt political
underinvestment"); see also Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, supra note 6, at
349-50 ("Fragmentation can thus lead to a failure to perceive or address broad social ills,
can lead to myopia and failure to empower one actor able to make broader perspective
strategic evaluations and decisions, or can empower a sequence of reviewing regulators
who may create a drag on or veto a project.").
313. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 6, at 5. see also id at 28-29
(comparing the regulator's dilemma faced with a regulatory commons to that of a fisher
viewing a common pool resource like an ocean, and saying "[i]n neither case would fishers
or potential regulators have strong incentives to invest in efforts to gather information
about the resource harms, lead collective efforts to devise curative strategies, or design a
responsive strategy. The shared nature of the underlying resource - be it a natural
resource or a regulatory opportunity - creates disincentives for such resource
stewardship.").
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Buzbee believes that "complex legal systems create predictable
dynamics that create incentives for regulatory gaps."34 The
resulting "uncertain regulatory turf" creates "demand and supply-
side incentives for regulatory inattention. 31 5 When these incentives
are combined with the preference of most regulators and the
regulated industry to maintain the status quo,1 6 it is unlikely that
the regulatory picture will change in the short term.1 7
Buzbee finds that aquaculture is a quintessential example of a
regulatory commons3 8  because there is no clear principal
regulatory authority, let alone one that has any incentive to take
the lead in regulating the activity.319 He blames "environmental
federalism"-by which he means "the shar[ing of] regulatory turf
in uncertain sorts of ways" between federal, state, and local
governments-for "the political-legal fragmentation and
overlap.3 20 Given the breadth of potential environmental and
socioeconomic harms from aquaculture activities, it is unlikely that
they will all fall under the regulatory authority of any one
jurisdiction.3 1' Local officials, who are often in the best position to
control particular nearshore aquaculture operations, are instead
more interested in promoting these local businesses. Thus, local
officials often have no reason to invest in either researching
aquaculture's risks or "policing" its impacts."'
Ocean fish ranching exhibits these and other features of a
regulatory commons. A regulatory commons exists where the
314. Id. at 6.
315. Id. at 14. "Supply side," in this context, refers to government actors, and
"demand side" refers to the regulated industry. Id. at 27.
316. Id. at 36 (explaining that regulators and those "benefiting from the status quo"
have little incentive to change it because they "have sunk money and effort" into
maintaining it and "are likely to become attached to it").
317. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 6, at 37 ("Regulatory
commons dynamics thus create logical incentives for lack of political investment in
regulatory solutions."). While one cure for the regulatory commons is to end the
fragmentation by asking agencies to "surrender turf to other agencies," Buzbee
acknowledges that this "would likely meet with staunch resistance." Id. at 50.
318. Id. at 8.
319. Id. at 9 (saying the absence of a "primary regulator" means that no one is
responsible for "transboundary or ecosystem aquaculture risks," nor is there a single entity
"likely to be blamed for [any] harms" that might arise). Buzbee also says regulatory
commons problems can occur "outside the setting of commons resource management
disputes." Id. at 7, n.8.
320. Id. at 23.




regulatory reach of any given institution cannot adequately
grapple with what are essentially inter-jurisdictional harms. Here,
the inter-jurisdictional harms are escaped fish and widely dispersed
pollution.32" Such regulatory commons also exists where the sheer
geographic breadth of the resource, here the oceans, dwarfs the
scope of the regulatory mechanism." 4  Finally, a regulatory
commons may occur in ocean fish ranching insofar as the "social
ill [caused by ocean fish ranching] arises out of dynamics,
incentives, or actors outside of a government's jurisdiction. ' 2 5 In
this case, the industry developed largely in response to "intensified
international competition to produce cheap fish" after wild fish
stocks "plummeted."
32 6
Buzbee posits that crisis conditions may eventually spur
"unusual political activism on the part of citizens, politicians, and
regulators," leading to changes in the regulatory commons and the
emergence of a regulatory response. 27 However, the harms from
ocean fish ranching may be sufficiently dispersed and distant to
prevent those conditions from arising. 2 ' Moreover, those harms
may most affect those with the least political power to effect a
change-impoverished fishing communities. Thus, it seems unlikely
that ocean fish ranching will soon emerge from its regulatory
commons.
323. Id. (describing the regional or even global "ripple effects" of escaped non-
indigenous or bioengineered fish on the marine environment).
324. Id. at 25 (citing oceans and marine resources as an "obvious example of a...
mismatch" between the size of the regulatory authority and the underlying resource).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 25-26. Even though the international legal framework offered by the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, (further developed at the 1992
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development, which addressed
conservation of marine resources and produced the UN Biodiversity Convention, the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, and Agenda 21), and the 1995 FAO Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, includes "emerging principles" like the
precautionary principle, the duty of states to cooperate in mitigating transboundary
environmental problems, and the duty to share information, UNCLOS III has done little
to address the problems of over-fishing. See Wilson, supra note 36, at 503; see also id. at 508-
09 (calling international solutions to over-fishing "imperfect" because they rely on
voluntary cooperation and do not incorporate local stakeholders in solutions).
327. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, supra note 6, at 54; id. at 55 ("[A]
combination of external events, political incentives, and changing information and
political perceptions can create conditions for enactment of unlikely regulatory schemes").
328. Even Buzbee concedes that unlike urban sprawl and global climate change,
where some improbable "collective efforts" have arisen, "aquaculture's fragmented
regulation remains unaddressed." Id. at 55-56.
2007]
72 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
B. Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to the FEZ Makes Good Policy
Sense
There are several good policy reasons for applying the public
trust doctrine to ocean fish ranching. First, applying the doctrine
would eliminate many of the regulatory commons-induced
disabilities that afflict the waters of the EEZ. For example, the
doctrine could be used to fill existing regulatory gaps, such as
preventing the placement of net pens in traditional fishing
grounds or requiring that pens be constructed in a way to prevent
the escape of farmed fish. The public trust doctrine could also be
used to protect trust resources where the problem is not a gap in
regulation but conflicting or overlapping regulatory programs. In
such a case, the doctrine would not be preempted because there is
no comprehensive federal regulatory regime to prevent its use.
Since public rights in those resources would be protected,"9 the
regulatory commons would vanish until a comprehensive
regulatory program could be developed and implemented to
supersede the current patchwork of federal and state regulation.
Second, application of the public trust doctrine could impose
an obligation on government agencies to scrutinize individual
proposals,"' including those seeking to enclose portions of the
EEZ. This would assure that conversion of trust resources serves a
public purpose and "do[es] not substantially impair the public
interest in the lands and waters remaining." 331 Given the
environmental risks associated with ocean fish ranching and its
incompatibility with traditional uses of navigable water like fishing,
329. See Babcock, Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, supra note 217, at 45 n.256 and
accompanying text (listing articles exploring potential use of public trust doctrine's use to
protect important natural resources that otherwise might be unprotected). Applying the
doctrine of ocean fish ranching is less of a stretch than applying the doctrine to some land-
based resources, as has been done in modern times. See id. at 37.
330. See Hildreth, supra note 240, at 230 ("The public trust doctrine's application
further seaward makes possible closer judicial scrutiny of state ocean management
activities, and such scrutiny can stimulate legislative and administrative improvements.");
Baer, supra note 232, at 433-35 (suggesting using the doctrine as (1) a "rule of
construction" that would "construe public land statutes liberally and in favor of public
trust beneficiaries"; (2) as part of the "hard look doctrine," resulting in judicial stricter
scrutiny and a higher standard of agency performance, and (3) as a "general principle of
environmental law," to determine whether the federal government considered both
environmental and economic uses of public lands when Congress has directed it to, or
more broadly, that it function as a "conceptual framework [within which courts can]
exercise judicial review,").
331. Illinois Central Railroad, 146 U.S. at 452.
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navigation, and recreation, it may be difficult for an agency to
authorize the activity without requiring mitigating preconditions.
Agencies might insist that fish ranchers choose facility locations
that do not interfere with traditional water uses, or that they
compensate individuals or communities who are harmed by side
effects such as loss of wild fish stocks. 32 In its strongest incarnation,
the doctrine might block the conveyance of trust resources to fish
ranchers entirely.
Applying the public trust doctrine to the EEZ makes good
policy sense for a third reason. Since the doctrine constrains state
police power authority, it acts as a check on potential abuses by the
states. For example, while currently a state could readily use its
police power to authorize destruction of wildlife or wildlife habitat
in the furtherance of general welfare, this would be much more
difficult to do under the rigorous standards required by
application of the public trust doctrine.33
Fourth, applying the doctrine would protect strong national
interests in the waters and resources of the EEZ. What the Court
said about wild birds in Missouri v. Holland could as easily be said of
migratory wild fish:
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is
involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert
with that of another power. The subject matter [migratory birds]
is only transitorily within the state and has no permanent habitat
therein. But for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no
birds for any powers to deal with .... It is not sufficient to rely
upon the States.334
Similarly, today wild fish stocks have reached a stage of crisis.
332. See Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 232, at 372-74 (recommending integration
of "broad public trust criteria" into aquaculture leasing laws, including a required finding
that the lease "is in the public interest or confers a public benefit," and that it will not
"unreasonab[ly]" interfere with riparian access to coastal waters, navigation, or fishing, as
well as criteria for setting "priorities among multiple non-aquaculture uses competing with
aquaculture applicants for the same site,").
333. Musiker et al., supra note 224, at 111-12, (discussing the courts' deference
toward state exercise of the police power, and citing Sax, supra note 203, at 478 (judicial
review of government action under the public trust doctrine is "more rigorous than that
applicable to governmental activity generally"); see also Meyers, Protection of Wildlife, supra
note 212, at 735 ("[A]pplication of legal standards that require clear legislative intent
before wildlife habitat is alienated, or that require a compelling purpose before those
resources can be adversely affected, will lead us to greater degrees of ecosystemic decision
making").
334. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
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According to Sax, one function of the public trust doctrine is to
avoid destabilizing changes that might occur as a result of an
environmental crisis, such as the sudden decline of a species.33
Here, application of the public trust doctrine is particularly
warranted to head off the destabilization that may occur as wild
fish stocks decline from the adverse effects of ocean fish ranching.
A fifth advantage of the public trust doctrine is that it would
blunt any takings challenges ocean fish ranchers might deploy to
block regulation of their activities.336 While it is generally agreed
that there is no legally cognizable property interest in wild stocks
of fish and that fishers who use their boats to fish in the EEZ are
"simply . . . enjoying a use of their property that the government
cho[o]se[s] not to disturb,""33 ocean fish ranchers' property rights
and interests may be different. Fish ranchers may have a property
interest in the net pens and other facilities they locate in the EEZ.
A court might consider those facilities to be a form of
constitutionally protected personal property,33 s making it difficult
for the government to restrict their use once they are set or to
order their removal. Additionally, if ocean fish ranchers are seen
as cultivators of a crop, not fishers, they may have a property right
in the fish themselves, especially if they have stocked those pens
with hatchery reared fish. However, under the public trust
doctrine, an owner of trust resources can do nothing to alienate
them in her favor, as she is no more than a custodian of those
resources for the benefit of present and future generations. 9
335. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14
U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 185, 188-89 (1980).
336. See Babcock, Things that Go Bump in the Night, supra note 217, at 892-98.
337. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. 379 F.3d 1363, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Parravano
v. Babbitt, 861 F. Supp. 914, 928 (N.D. Cal. 1994) affd, 70 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Magnuson Act does not confer on commercial fishermen "any right or title in the fishery
resources" under the government's regulatory authority); see also Britton, supra note 229, at
247 ("Despite the many characteristics of property that ITQs possess, it remains apparent
that the rights afforded to ITQ holders exist only as a result of permissive government
legislation, which may in the future be revoked like any other 'privilege.'")
338. Cf Britton, supra note 229, at 239 ("Courts have regularly acknowledged the
compensable nature of leaseholds, both inside and outside of the context of fisheries
related leaseholds.").
339. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 367 (Mass.
1979) ("The land in question is not, like ordinary private land held in fee simple absolute,
subject to development at the sole whim of the owner, but is impressed with a public trust,
which gives the public's representatives an interest and responsibility in its
development."); see also Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature:
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1452 (1993)
(suggesting a usufructuary model of property right as an analogue to the concept of
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Doctrinally, the right to convert a trust resource to a private use is
simply not included in the bundle of ownership sticks she might
otherwise possess. Therefore, any governmental restriction on the
uses of those resources cannot constitute a taking of private
property.s4 Applying these doctrinal principles to ocean fish
ranchers means that any ownership interest they might declare in
their equipment or the fish themselves, both of which this Article
posits are subject to the public trust doctrine, would fall before the
dominant public interest in the ocean and fisheries resource and
could not block their regulation.
Courts have applied the public trust doctrine to a wide range of
resources and activities where statutory regulatory regimes have
not been sufficient to protect important public resources.3 ' While
applying the doctrine to the EEZ has its challenges, the effort to
do so is worthwhile, especially if it could displace the regulatory
commons that afflicts ocean fish ranching. The potential harms
from fish ranching are too great and the public resources of the
EEZ too valuable to be left in the limbo created by a patchwork of
poorly coordinated regulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is a fact, as singular as it was unexpected in the jurisprudence
of our state, that the taking [of] a few bushels of oysters . . .
should involve in it questions momentous in their nature as well
as in their magnitude . . . and embracing, in their investigation,
the laws of nations and of England, the relative rights of
sovereign and subjects, as well as the municipal regulations of our
county.
While there are beneficial aspects to ocean fish ranching, there
are also perils. At present, these perils are either unregulated or
subject to a cacophony of conflicting and overlapping regulation.
This situation creates the unfortunate conditions of a regulatory
commons, allowing many of the potential harms of fish ranching
custodianship).
340. See generally Babcock, Things that Go Bump in the Night, supra note 217, at 892-98;
Babcock, Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, supra note 217, at 55-59.
341. Babcock, Where the Wild Things Are, supra note 217, at 891 (discussing the
expansion in the doctrine's geographic scope and the uses it protects).
342. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821), quoted in Macinko supra note 26, at 936.
Macinko notes the country has "moved from finding great national principles at stake in
the disposition of rights to a few bushels of oysters to a barely concealed yawn" when these
same principles are applied to "the disposition of rights to the entire halibut resource off
Alaska." Id. at 954.
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to go unchecked.
While the thrust of the public trust doctrine suggests that it
might be used to protect the natural resources of the EEZ until a
coherent regulatory regime develops, it has been unclear whether
the doctrine applies so far from shore. This Article suggests that it
can apply, either based on the existence of a federal public trust
doctrine or on the expansion of state common law to the EEZ. As
illustrated by the experience with IFQs, allotting private property
rights does not fill this regulatory gap as successfully as applying
the public trust doctrine to the resources of the EEZ. Since the
environmental and socioeconomic harms of ocean fish ranching
are largely external, there is little incentive for the rancher to
abate them. Allowing fish ranchers to enclose the ocean for their
own commercial purposes will not protect, let alone conserve, the
fishery resources of the EEZ, nor will it serve social justice. Private
property rights do not account for the public benefit and offer no
antidote to the perils of a regulatory commons. Only the public
trust doctrine assures proper oversight of ocean fish ranching and
consideration of public benefits until a comprehensive regulatory
program is developed. Unless the doctrine is applied to the EEZ as
an interim measure, the perils associated with ocean fish ranching
may continue, and rather than taking pressure off of wild fish
stocks, may cause their demise.
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